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Introduction: Will Bitcoins Become a New Global Currency? 
Probably not. 
Whether due to their apparent ease in facilitating money laundering and 
procuring illegal substances without involving established financial 
institutions, or merely because they have received a lot of press lately, 
Bitcoins1 have increasingly come under scrutiny by the regulatory agencies 
of various state, federal and international governments.2 In all statements so 
far, these regulatory bodies have been intentionally vague and speculative 
regarding how and when such enforcement would take place.3 Several 
tremulous steps taken by committees on the nascent technology have been 
characterized by fundamental misconceptions as to the nature of virtual 
currency.4 The questions that have been left unanswered include: Is there a 
purpose to be served in such regulation? And, how would such regulation 
be conducted? This article seeks to provide preliminary answers to those 
questions, and to posit a framework for considering virtual currency in a 
regulatory framework that will grow as the incipient technology develops. 
                                                                                                                 
 * Faculty Associate, School of Criminology and Criminal Justice, Arizona State 
University, Phoenix, Ariz. Previously law clerk for the Hon. Judge H. Russell Holland, 
Federal District of Alaska. I would like to thank my mentor Professor Joel Dobris at the 
University of California, Davis, my family, and Douglas Rennie for their assistance in the 
writing of this article. 
 1. “Bitcoins” in this article will be used to refer to the Bitcoin network and concept 
exclusively; “bitcoins” refers to an actual unit of the Bitcoin exchange; “Coins” (with a 
capital “C”) refers to Bitcoins and its derivative virtual currency, including Dogecoins, 
Flexcoins, etc. When I refer to Bitcoins, I mean the specific algorithms and processes by 
which this virtual currency is used. When I refer to the concept in general, I will use the 
more generic phrase “virtual currency,” although some in the tech community use the 
expression “digital currency” to denote the same concept. 
 2. New York State Currency Regulatory Board, California Attorney General’s Office, 
Japanese Federal Government. 
 3. Fin. Crimes Enforcement Network, Dep’t of the Treasury, Guidance:  Application 
of FinCEN's Regulations to Persons Administering, Exchanging, or Using Virtual 
Currencies, FINCEN (No. FIN-2013-G001, Mar. 18, 2013), http://fincen.gov/statutes_regs/ 
guidance/pdf/FIN-2013-G001.pdf [hereinafter Treasury Guidance FIN-2013-G001]. 
 4. See e.g., Fed. Election Comm’n, Draft Advisory Opinion 2013-15 (Conservative 
Action Fund) (Nov. 7, 2013), available at http://saos.nictusa.com/aodocs/201315.pdf. 
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This article will begin with an overview of the most successful virtual 
currency created to date –Bitcoin- and explain its progeny: virtual currency 
created by substantially duplicating the coding and ideas of the Bitcoin. 
From there, the article will describe how virtual currency abuts current 
regulatory law, and how it may develop in the future. Finally, I will propose 
framework for a regulatory environment that will regulate virtual currency 
in its current form and continue to serve future developments. 
Bitcoin is a decentralized, peer-to-peer network for the exchange of 
unique serial numbers. Possession of these numbers is exclusive to the 
owner of the Coin, owned by them in an encrypted file. Bitcoins allow for 
secure transfer of ownership without the need for a trusted third party. The 
unit of the network is bitcoin, or BTC, which has been alternatively argued 
to be a currency, commodity, or method of exchange. The Bitcoin network 
launched in 2009 after years of development by Satoshi Nakamoto, an 
individual or group whose identity is still debated.5 
The network began with the publication of a mathematical proof which 
spurred “miners” to use software programs that follow the mathematical 
formula to produce bitcoins. The formula and software are freely available 
for anyone to use. There is a finite amount of bitcoins that may be produced 
and as more bitcoins are created, the mathematical computations required to 
create more become increasingly difficult. Bitcoins can be traded or used to 
buy goods and services. All bitcoin transactions are recorded in the “block 
chain” - a massive and transparent ledger of each and every bitcoin 
transaction maintained by the miners. There is no central authority that 
oversees Bitcoin. 
Background: Virtual Currency in General 
I. How Virtual Currency Differs from Traditional Money Transmission 
A. Current E-Transmission of Money 
1. Electronic Funds Transfers 
Electronic funds transfers (“EFTs”) have been established and common 
since the 1980s, and they have become an inextricable part of the global 
economy. Virtual currency is distinct from previous electronic funds 
transfers by the elimination of a heretofore-unthinkable step: No dollars are 
                                                                                                                 
 5. A man who has been living under the name Satoshi Nakamoto for decades has been 
identified in Northern California, but whether he is the developer in whole or in part remains 
an open question. 
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ever routed through centralized financial organizations. This distinction 
leads to several radical departures between the regulatory outcome of the 
two methods, and an understanding of the current enforcement regime is 
necessary in order to understand what changes must occur if the system can 
apply to virtual currency. 
Article 4A of the UCC, promulgated by the ALI and National 
Conference, enacted in all fifty states and endorsed by the Fed,6 forms the 
backbone of large money payments from one business or financial 
institution to another though electronic means.7 The Electronic Fund 
Transfer Act governs point-of-sale transactions in which retail customers 
pay for purchases by use of an access or debit card at a retail store, ATM 
transactions; direct deposit; and preauthorization withdrawals.8 Wire 
transfers (typically in small amounts) are covered under money 
transmission laws by the states but not governed by Article 4A. 
EFTs necessarily involve a bank account in the transferor’s country, and 
a separate account in the transferee’s country. Each bank must conduct 
itself according to local laws, and the transfers thus fall into several 
enforcement regimes.9 For example, a business in California buying 
widgets in China must send the payment from their California bank, which 
implicates California banking and business codes, federal banking secrecy 
acts, and federal money laundering regimes. Once the money reaches a 
bank in China with an agreement with the California bank, it must place the 
money in the correct account in accordance with Chinese banking law. This 
is the simplest possible example, but even this simple transfer precipitates 
substantial legislative oversight, without much protecting the beneficiary.10 
  
                                                                                                                 
 6. U.C.C. art. 4A (amended 2012). 
 7. Id.. 
 8. 15 U.S.C. § 1693a(6) (2012). 
 9. U.C.C. § 4A-302. 
 10. Mark Sneddon, The Effect of Uniform Commercial Code Article 4A on the Law of 
International Credit Transfers, 29 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1107 (1996), available at http://digital 
commons.lmu.edu/llr/vol29/iss3/11. 


































Fig 1: Traditional Electronic Funds Transfer 
 
How are millions of dollars transferred from New York to California in a 
few hours? Perhaps a “Two bank transfer” occurs, which is actually two 
payment orders: first, from the Buyer to their bank, and second, from the 
buyer’s bank to the beneficiary’s bank.11 Usually in these cases, the banks 
have settlement agreements through “cross accounts” or a “common 
account” which they have agreed on prior to this exchange. Another manner 
of large money transfer is a “CHIPS” transfer, if both the originator’s’ and 
beneficiary’s’ banks are participants in the Clearing House Interbank 
Payments System of the New York Clearing House Association. Or, if the 
banks have accounts in privity with the Fed, they may use Fedwire to settle 
their accounts. 
 A funds transfer involves a series of payment orders, defined in 4A-
103(a)(1) as “an instruction of a sender to a receiving bank . . . to pay, or 
cause another bank to pay, a fixed or determinable amount of money to a 
beneficiary ***.” As a result of “acceptance” of a payment order, the rights 
and obligations of the participants is defined under Article 4A.12 
Acceptance obligates the receiving bank to execute a payment order by 
sending it to a receiving bank, and itself becoming a sender.13 Eventually 
                                                                                                                 
 11. EARNEST T. PATRIKIS, THOMAS C. BAXTER, JR. & RAJ K. BHALA, WIRE TRANSFERS 
140 (1993)  
 12. U.C.C. § 4A-209. 
 13. Id. § 4A-209(a), 302(a)(1), 402(c).  
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the final receiving bank, the beneficiary’s bank, receives the payment order 
and becomes liable for the amount of the payment order to the 
beneficiary.14 Speed of processing takes precedence over assignment of 
liability. Payment orders under 4A are not intended to require banks to 
engage in inquiries as to whether conditions have been satisfied, and banks 
act essentially as functionaries.15 Banks that accept the payment order must 
ensure that they send it, which makes the wholesale money wire transfer 
system cheap, speedy, and final. Summary judgments are permitted on 
Article 4A.16 
Funds transfers are very efficient for moving large amounts of money. 
Fraudulent payment orders are therefore a concern. Fraudulently executed 
orders may cause a chain of banks to transfer payment orders to an account 
controlled by the thief in another bank. Under 4A a receiving bank that 
executes a payment order is not acting as an agent of the sender.17 But the 
agency doctrines of actual, implied, and apparent authority are difficult to 
apply to these larger, more impersonal functionary transactions. In the 
funds transfer realm, the key concept is whether such payments were 
“authorized,” albeit in a different context than authority as exists in agency 
law. Thus, in order to facilitate banks’ willingness to transfer millions, 
billions, and trillions of dollars quickly all over the world, banks that 
execute payments that “test” can send the order without fear of liability.18 
So long as the banks use a security procedure that is commercially 
reasonable and the receiving bank proves that it accepted the order in good 
faith after verifying the order in compliance with that security procedure, 
the payment order is effective, whether or not the customer actually 
authorized it.19 Thus, customers accept most of the risk of loss, although 
banks have the burden or ensuring that they use reasonable security 
procedures. 
2. Credit Card Payments 
Credit card payments are the most useful methods for payments made by 
consumers in smaller dollar amounts. The transfers are surprisingly 
similarly unsecure as electronic funds transfers. Indeed, little has changed 
                                                                                                                 
 14. Id. § 4A-404(a). 
 15. Centre-Point Merchant Bank v. Am. Express Bank, 913 F. Supp. 202, 208 
(S.D.N.Y. 1996). 
 16. Aleo Intl., Ltd. v. Citibank, 612 N.Y.S.2d 540 (S. Ct. N.Y. Cty., 1994). 
 17. U.C.C. § 4A-212. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. § 4A-203. 
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in the actual technology of transferring funds from the 1980s framework. 
Other than bouncing the signals off a satellite instead of through sea cables, 
US systems still use the relatively unsecure format-preserving 58k 
encryption of credit card information in terminal-to-terminal sales, while 
only purchases over the Internet use the more secure 128-bit pseudo-
random hexadecimal encryption but lack authentication features. 
“Universal” credit cards issued by financial institutions provide 
unsecured short-term credit to cardholders to permit them to purchase from 
a universe of merchants and sellers that are not associated with the card. 
The merchant or seller is faced with several risks in honoring a credit card. 
First, the person may not be authorized to use the card, and the credit line 
that looks legitimate may not be paid through. Second, the issuer may have 
revoked the card. Third, the amount of credit given by the issuer to the 
cardholder may not be sufficient to cover the amount of the purchase. 
Usually, however, the risk for some or all of the purchase is taken by the 
issuer, which charges a fee to compensate for the risk. Fees to the merchant 
for receiving a payment through the issuer are called the “interchange fee,” 
and generally average about 1.5% of the sales price. 
Cardholders enjoy dramatically limited statutory liability to charges not 
in excess of $50, if the issuer has given adequate notice of the potential 
liability and provided a method whereby the user can be identified as the 
authorized user for unauthorized use of their cards.20 “Unauthorized Use” 
means a use of a credit card by a person other than the cardholder who does 
not have actual, implied, or apparent authority for such use and from which 
the cardholder receives no benefit.21 Apparent authority is the most 
commonly litigated situation; as apparent authority for use may arise 
through a cardholder’s negligence.22 
States have also hotly debated the consumer protections inherent in 
credit cards since their origins in the 1960s, such as the extent to which 
consumers may chargeback their payments if goods are delivered in a 
defective state or never delivered. The 1974 Fair Credit Billing Act, now 
the Consumer Credit Protection Act,23 regulates the rights between 
cardholders and card issuers. These provisions allow issuers to make 
agreements governing relationships with merchants, merchant banks, and 
issuing banks, allowing limited recourse and chargeback in the case of a 
                                                                                                                 
 20. 15 U.S.C. § 1643 (2012). 
 21. Id. § 1602. 
 22. Minskoff v. Am. Express Travel Related Servs. Co., Inc., 98 F.3d 703 (2d Cir. 
1996). 
 23. 15 U.S.C. § 1666. 
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dispute.24 However, there are geographic limitations on the cardholder’s use 
of defenses to payment against the issuer. 
3. Current Payment Process on the Internet 
Most Internet sales are currently paid for by credit cards, which are 
leading to increasing losses as security problems mount. Typical online 
sales are considered “card-not-present” transactions as opposed to face-to-
face sales, where brick-and-mortar stores may verify the identity of the 
cardholder. Internet sales leave the merchant liable for the loss.25 More 
Internet transactions are charged back than retail transactions and stolen 
credit card numbers can be easily used to make purchases.26 Credit card 
numbers are easily stolen and sold, each stolen credit card being worth 
approximately $25 on the international black market. The hacker who stole 
millions of credit card numbers from Target made several million dollars 
selling them on the Internet. 
Already several obvious reasons emerge for preferring a virtual currency, 
which lead to several non-obvious reasons that signal a real reason for the 
global transactional market to make a shift. Before computers became 
ubiquitous, the fundamental organization of business monetary transfer was 
largely the same as today. Inventory, price lists, payroll, accounts 
receivable all recorded on a ledger or series of ledgers. American law and 
accounting rules mean every business must know exactly what its current 
prices are, inventory, shipping, accounts receivable, payable and a 
multitude of other factors. Computers built specifically for calculating these 
business transactions can now read in large amounts of data and apply 
operations to that data. These mainframes manage gargantuan amounts of 
data and process transactions continually. Today, a large portion of 
operations are done in-memory, as opposed to punch-cards and reel-to-reel 
tape, but businesses operate in the same fundamental way because in order 
to have transactional integrity, everything has to be checked against and 
applied to the ledger. Everything must eventually be tallied in a centralized 
system prevent double-booking or double-spending.27 
                                                                                                                 
 24. Id. §1666i. 
 25. Thomas E. Weber, What Do You Risk Using a Credit Card to Shop on the Net, 
WALL. ST. J., Dec. 10, 2001, at B1. 
 26. Julia Angwin, Credit-Card Scams Bedevil E-Stores, WALL. ST. J., Sept. 19, 2000, at 
B1. 
 27. Cf. Joshua A. Kroll, Ian C. Davey & Edwward W. Felten, The Economics of Bitcoin 
Mining, or Bitcoin in the Presence of Adversaries (paper delivered at the Twelfth Workshop on 
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In the same fashion, credit cards run similar ledgers, except a card’s 
balance is applied to an individual or organization’s personal credit 
account. After locking the account to prevent tampering with transmissions, 
the card issuer will inspect the transaction for signs of fraud, deduct money 
from the customer’s balance and credit the merchant, take fees, and the 
ledger will have the transaction recorded, then unlocked, which will send a 
return signal to the merchant that the transaction was successful. Because it 
is centralized to a single point of authority, the entire process takes only a 
few milliseconds. The complexity of computers, network, and engineering 
involved in this system is tremendous. 
B. How Virtual Currency Works on a Technical Level 
1. The Bitcoin’s Block-Chain 
Surprising to those who think of Bitcoins as anonymous currency, virtual 
currency is inextricably linked with a public ledger of transfer.28 In fact, the 
very foundation of the Bitcoin’s existence is bound with a public record of 
every exchange of every coin between transferors and transferees, 
published to all other users on the network, forming a chain that can be 
tracked the creation of the currency.29 This list of all transfers, going back 
to the “Genesis Block” of original Bitcoins, is called the “Block chain.”30 
2. The Bitcoin Transfer Process 
Bitcoin is essentially a unique serial number that gets hashed31 using 
public-key cryptography whenever an owner wants to send a payment to a 
transferee. The transferor has a ledger indicating their ownership of a 
certain Bitcoin, which they have in their turn received via a series of 
transfers from the original Genesis block, each transfer of which is recorded 
and hashed again.  Once the transferor declares they want to make a 
payment, they encrypt their owned serial number and announce to whom 
they want to make a transfer.32 The public announcement is secure because 
all the vital information is encrypted, including the verification of the serial 
                                                                                                                 
the Economics of Information Security (WEIS 2013), Washington, D.C., June 11-12, 2013), 
available at http://www.weis2013.econinfosec.org/papers/KrollDaveyFeltenWEIS2013.pdf. 
 28. There are virtual currencies that do not use public ledgers in existence but they are 
not highly utilized and do not meet the definition of currency for this article. 
 29. SATOSHI NAKAMOTO, BITCOIN: A PEER-TO-PEER ELECTRONIC CASH SYSTEM (2009), 
available at https://bitcoin.org/bitcoin.pdf. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Encrypted, in the most generic sense. 
 32. NAKAMOTO, supra note 29. 
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number. The ingenious trick is that the verification is done by the public 
and discoverable, as computers on the network figure out what nonce33 has 
been used with the public key.  Other computers on the network, unrelated 
to the transaction, can verify the transfer by finding the nonce, which is 
relatively easy to discover within a few minutes by brute-forcing 
algorithms. By doing so, the transfer is verified as legitimate and at the 
same time a record of the transfer is made and distributed to the network, 
although the identities of the transferor and transferee are still encrypted 
and, theoretically, unknowable.34 This means that all transferees of Bitcoins 
are on the public ledger, although their identities are encrypted. The block 








Fig 2: Hash Chain 
 
Where do Bitcoin serial numbers come from? Actually, there are no 
stable serial numbers that correspond to any particular bitcoin. Transaction 
hashes fulfill the role of the serial number. In any transaction, the transferee 
receives a unique hash of their public key and the transferor’s bitcoin serial 
number, which in turn was the output of an earlier transaction. Each transfer 
hashes the old serial number into a new one, which can only be transferred 
by the new owner.35 
There are two implications to Bitcoin’s use of transaction hashes instead 
of serial numbers. First, Bitcoins are not separate, persistent “coins” of 
unique serial numbers, rather each Bitcoin is better thought of as a series of 
transactions that show up in the block chain. The second, and more 
important result of operating in this way is that it obviates the need for any 
central authority to issue or verify the serial numbers.36 Instead, the serial 
numbers are self-generated, merely by hashing previous numbers from prior 
transactions. 
                                                                                                                 
 33. Permutation of the public key. 
 34. NAKAMOTO, supra note 29. 
 35. This owes to the unique nature of public-key cryptography. The details of how this 
works are incredibly innovative, but beyond the scope of this article.  See id. 
 36. Id. 















Further attempts to 
transfer fail 
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In fact, it’s possible to keep following the chain of transactions further 
back in history than just the previous transfer. Ultimately, this process must 
terminate. The chain of transfers can be followed back to one of two 
originating transactions. The first possibility is that the ledger tracks back to 
the first Bitcoin transaction, contained in the so-called Genesis block, the 
original bitcoins. This is a special transaction, having no inputs, but a 50 
bitcoin output. In other words, this transaction established the initial money 
supply.37 The Genesis block is treated separately by Bitcoin clients, and 
although the details can be more complex than the standard transaction, we 
can think about these transfers in a similar fashion to subsequent 
transactions described above. The important thing to remember is just that 
anyone can create a Genesis block of a Bitcoin-like virtual currency by 
making an initial transaction.38 From there, subsequent transfers can be 
made by the initial transferees to anybody. 
The second (and more likely) possibility would be to track the coin back 
to a “coinbase transaction.” Except for the Genesis block, every block of 
transactions in the block chain starts with a special coinbase transaction. 
Coinbase transactions are created to reward the third party miners who 
confirm others’ transactions. They are designed to reward that miner for 
validating that block of transactions. The hash uses a similar but not 
identical format to the Genesis transaction described above. Coinbase 
transactions are rewards to incentivize the other users of the network to 
donate their resources verifying transfers between other, anonymous, users. 
Unfortunately, they are set to expire after a given period of time or number 
of transfers, effectively capping the upper-bound of the given currency, 








Fig 3: Hash numbers between transfers 
                                                                                                                 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id.. In 2024, miners will cease to be compensated for facilitating transfers, and 
“mining” will either cease entirely or be done in return for bounties offered by the 
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3. What This Means 
How anonymous is Bitcoin? Many people claim that Bitcoin can be used 
anonymously. This claim has led to the formation of marketplaces such 
as the Silk Road (and various successors), which specialize in illegal goods. 
However, the claim that Bitcoin is anonymous is a myth.40 The block chain 
is public, meaning that it is possible for anyone to see every Bitcoin 
transaction ever, back to the Genesis block or coinbase transaction. 
Although Bitcoin addresses aren’t immediately associated with real-world 
identities, computer scientists have done much work figuring out how to de-
anonymize “anonymous” social networks. The block chain is a marvelous 
target for these techniques. The great majority of Bitcoin users will be 
identified with relatively high confidence and ease in the near future. 
The confidence interval linking block chain transferees and individuals 
will be enough to achieve probable cause for further investigation of 
discovered individuals, but not high enough to generate convictions without 
more evidence. But law enforcement will soon be able to identify likely 
targets whom they suspect of illegally using virtual currency. Furthermore, 
identification will be retrospective, meaning that someone who bought 
drugs on Silk Road in 2011 will still be identifiable on the basis of the 
block chain whenever these techniques are developed. These de-
anonymization techniques are well known to computer scientists, and 
therefore to the NSA, and likely eventually will be used by law 
enforcement. 
The existence of this public ledger is essential to ensuring that Bitcoins 
cannot be double-spent, which means that the ledger is, absent some 
currently-unforeseeable technological development,41 a necessary function 
of the currency. The implications of this are nontrivial, and it is vital to 
understand that this ledger must exist for secure virtual currency to exist, to 
understand how any likely possible regulatory scheme may be 
implemented. Any discussion of “virtual currency” that does not include the 
                                                                                                                 
 40. Fergal Reid & Martin Harrigan, An Analysis of Anonymity in the Bitcoin System,  in 
SECURITY AND PRIVACY IN SOCIAL NETWORKS 197 (Yaniv Altshuler et al. eds., 2013), 
available at http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/stamp/stamp.jsp?tp=&arnumber=6113303&isnumber= 
6113084 
 41. See Patricia Everacre, Isabelle Simplot-Ryl & Issa Traoré, Double Spending 
Protection for E-Cash Based on Risk Management, in INFORMATION SECURITY 394 (Mike 
Burmester, Gene Tsudik, Spyros Magliveras & Ivana E. Ilić eds., 2011) (Lecture Notes in 
Computer Science No. 6531), available at http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-18178-8_33/. 
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public ledger is either misinformed or discussing a technology that cannot 
in good faith be called virtual currency.42 
The last significant development in virtual currency is the creation of 
various online currency exchanges.43 These exchanges permit the trading of 
actual cash into various cryptocurrencies (which now number over one 
hundred), and the exchange of these currencies. An exchange will also take 
possession of Coins owned by a customer and hold them in trust. An 
exchange can make paper trades on Coins held in trust, offer them for sale, 
and (supposedly) hold Coins safely. In theory, virtual currency exchanges 
permit buyers, sellers, and speculators to come to a consensus on Coin price 
similar to traditional stock and commodity markets. In practice, Bitcoin 
exchanges are targets for hackers and thieves, and are often operated 
dishonestly and openly operate with security holes amounting to 
negligence,44 while speculators end up eating their hats on uncontrolled 
currency losses.45 Even the Winklevoss twins, who have become famous 
for suing Mark Zuckerberg, are venture capitalists attempting to generate 
support for their Bitcoin payment processing system.46 Several more 
legitimate currency exchanges have since been created with a focus on 
security and efficiency, the most important of which is Coinbase, which has 
attracted $25 million in venture capital.47 
  
                                                                                                                 
 42. At least, this is the case barring further cryptographic developments. 
 43. Mt. Gox and Flexcion were two of the largest early adopters, but both have closed 
their doors after being hacked. Cryptsy, a U.S.-based exchange, shows the same signs of 
mismanagement but is currently still operational. Vircurex, a Chinese exchange, and Kraken, 
a UK and U.S. located exchange, are also both operating at the time of this publication. 
 44. See, e.g., CoinLab, Inc. v. Mt. Gox KK Et Al, No.,  2:13-cv-00777 (W.D. Wash. 
Oct. 4, 2013). 
 45. Reddit Hat Eat, YOUTUBE (Mar. 26, 2014), available at http://youtu.be/mjiX7xiFD-o/.  
 46. Colleen Taylor, With $1.5M Led by Winklevoss Capital, BitInstant Aims to Be the Go-
To Site to Buy and Sell Bitcoins, TECHCRUNCH.COM (May 17, 2013), available at http:// 
techcrunch.com/2013/05/17/with-1-5m-led-by-winklevoss-capital-bitinstant-aims-to-be-the-
go-to-site-to-buy-and-sell-bitcoins/. 
 47. For information about Coinbase, see ABOUT COINBASE, https://coinbase.com/about/ 
(last visited July 9, 2014). See also ATLAS [NORTH AMERICA], https://atlasats.com (last 
visited July 9, 2014); PERSEUS, http://perseustelecom.com (last visited July 9, 2014).  
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II. Use of Virtual Currency Today and Tomorrow 
A. What Advantages Do Public Ledger Virtual Currencies Have Over 
Single-Point Payments? 
1. Cost Advantage 
The first and most justifiable reason a virtual currency should exist and 
enjoy frequent use is the convenience and safety of such payment methods. 
Public ledger payments are inconvenient, but they are inconvenient at a 
constant rate. The costs of Bitcoins do not scale upward for large payments 
as opposed to small payments, or for international payments as opposed to 
local payments. Indeed, the major reasons for Bitcoin adoption involves 
harmless, if nerdy, hobby trading.  Small-scale sales of durable goods 
(hobby collectibles which I will consider a kind of commodity) is not 
economical when factoring in exchange rates and international payment 
fees. Virtual currency somewhat mitigates these problems. 
Additional problems with long-distance sales include international 
escrow in the age of the internet: a stable international payment system 
would make international purchasing, labor and regulatory costs much 
easier to minimize by globally sourcing the cheapest location regardless of 
local currency. In fact, it is conceivable that with large-scale trading hubs, 
international currency arbitrage will become radically altered in the future. 
Bitcoin is the first invention of a method of transfer between unknown 
parties without needing recourse to a trusted third party. 
For example, Bitcoin or other digital currencies might enable individuals 
to transfer money as seamlessly as sending an email, while reducing money 
transfer and currency conversion fees.  Payments between unknown parties 
can take place without regard to which countries those parties live in. This 
is a significant step forward for the global market. 
Businesses may use Bitcoins to accept non-cash payments for the same 
percentage fee regardless of purchase amount ($5M or $0.05). Again, this 
makes virtual currency much more lucrative for business-owners seeking a 
global market, and allows competitive advantage on the global stage 
without international barriers to transaction caused by the use of 
intermediaries such as banks or credit card companies. As payment costs 
scale upward, international money transferors charge fees that begin to 
outgrow profits, like tariffs reducing the efficiency of the global market. 
Travelers may conceivably buy goods abroad without paying cross-
border fees typically charged by banks. However, it is important to note that 
the future could look different as rising regulatory and operating costs for 
Bitcoin and potentially falling costs for the conventional players as they are 
14 10 OKLA. J.L. & TECH. 70 (2014)  [Vol. 10 
 
 
forced to compete could narrow the cost savings in using virtual currency. 
Just as a flurry of new entrants – such as Square, Groupon, and PayPal - 
encouraged payment networks and payment processors to develop a mobile 
payments strategy, traditional payment players will likely develop virtual 
currency strategies. 
Currently, consumers pay a money transfer fee as a percentage of the 
total amount transferred: approximately 10% on average. Money transfer 
networks, such as Western Union, charge these fees for accessing their 
network, as well as to cover agent commissions and foreign exchange 
conversion fees. Today, Bitcoin could theoretically reduce these fees to 1% 
by bypassing traditional money transfer systems and instead enabling 
transfers directly between two Bitcoin wallets. As a result, annual net 
savings for consumers could theoretically amount to over $43 billion based 
on the World Bank’s estimate of global money transfers.48  But any savings 
in this context usually involves at least one of the parties being unbanked, 
which would make converting bitcoin into local currency very difficult. 
And in countries where access to a bank, or conversion of foreign currency 
has been limited, virtual currency is likely to face similar challenges.49 The 
tight control China has taken to devalue the Yuan has led it to become the 
first nation to outlaw banks from trading in Bitcoin. This makes conversion 
of Yuan into Bitcoin much more difficult than simply using a traditional 
payment method. 
Clearly, the biggest hurdle to widespread adoption of virtual currency 
would be maintaining its cost-advantage over traditional payment methods. 
In fact, as we consider the regulatory structure of virtual currency, we will 
either see any development stymied by over-reaching regulation, or we 
must create a regulatory system that fosters this development by 
maintaining its competitive edge over traditional payment schemes. 
The use of virtual currency will only grow if it can maintain its cost-
advantage over traditional payment methods. The most likely area where 
virtual currencies can maintain this advantage is through global product 
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Fig. 4: Calculating the Real Value of a Bitcoin50 
 
2. Ease of Use in Illegal or Sensitive Transactions 
A second, and less justifiable reason for use of virtual currency, but one 
that has led to a large part of its adoption, is the avoidance of banking 
regulations and laws. Bank secrecy laws, especially the reporting 
requirements that have been implemented since 9/11, have led to 
burdensome and invasive reporting requirements.51 But despite their poor 
implementation and unintended consequences, there is no legitimate reason 
to avoid these requirements except money laundering and tax evasion. And, 
indeed, Bitcoins have become a fairly robust platform by which to engage 
in illegal transactions. 
There is an “underground” Internet, known as the TOR network,52 which 
exists mainly to provide anonymity through multiple layers of blind identity 
encryption. This network, outside of the traditional Internet, has been used 
to buy and sell black market goods, but until recently the major hurdle to 
implementation has been the inability to anonymously ensure payment. 
Bitcoins have led to a Silk Road website on the TOR network by providing 
the anonymous payment scheme needed to conduct illicit deals. The Silk 
Road and its progeny, underground Internet hubs for the sale of drugs and 
                                                                                                                 
 50. CTM1 (the cost of traditional money in a transaction) minus CCC (the fixed cost to 
create the coin) minus RP (the risk premium associated with losses, thefts, frauds) equals 
VCV (the value of a virtual coin). 
 51. Bank Secrecy Act Regulations – Definitions and Other Regulations Relating to 
Money Services Businesses, 31 C.F.R. § 1010.100(ff) (2011) (the “MSB Rule”). This 
defines an MSB as 
a person wherever located doing business, whether or not on a regular basis or 
as an organized or licensed business concern, wholly or in substantial part 
within the United States, in one or more of the capacities listed in paragraphs 
(ff)(1) through (ff)(6) of this section. This includes but is not limited to 
maintenance of any agent, agency, branch, or office within the United States. 
 52. The Onion Router, so-called because its Russian-doll layers of encryption are 





(From 1 - 10%) 







16 10 OKLA. J.L. & TECH. 70 (2014)  [Vol. 10 
 
 
other contraband, spring into existence as fast as the DEA and FBI can shut 
them down.53 In October 2013, the U.S. government shut down the Silk 
Road website and seized $28 million in Bitcoins,54 but a second Silk Road 
came online soon afterwards.  In fact, it seems likely that the convenience 
of virtual currency and anonymity of the TOR underground network will 
lead to a persistent online black market from this point onward. 
The U.S. Senate has held hearings aimed at discovering whether these 
so-called crypto-currencies are a tool for drug dealers and money launderers 
to do business beyond official scrutiny, and stat regulators have held panels 
on how best to manage the panorama of new virtual currencies. Bitcoins 
can be “legal means of exchange” according to officials from the U.S. 
Justice Department, which recognizes “that virtual currencies, in and of 
themselves, are not illegal.”55 Fed Chairman Ben S. Bernanke wrote to the 
Senate committee the U.S. central bank has no plans to regulate the 
currency: “Although the Federal Reserve generally monitors developments 
in virtual currencies and other payments system innovations, it does not 
necessarily have authority to directly supervise or regulate these 
innovations or the entities that provide them to the market.” 
The use of virtual currency in money laundering enterprises is 
concerning. The goal of traditional money laundering is to channel money 
through a source of intermediary so as to conceal its source.56 Prosecuting 
virtual currency exchanges has little chance of diminishing the use of 
virtual currency in money laundering.57 
                                                                                                                 
 53. Press Release, U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, HSI Seizes Silk Road 
Underground Black Market Website (Oct. 2, 2013), available at http://www.ice.gov/news/ 
releases/1310/131002baltimore.htm. 
 54. Press Release, U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, Manhattan U.S. Attorney 
Announces Seizure of Additional $28 Million Worth of Bitcoins Belonging to Ross William 




 55. Max Raskin, U.S. Agencies to Say Bitcoins Offer Legitimate Benefits, BLOOMBERG 
(Nov. 18, 2013, 4:08 PM CT), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-11-18/u-s-agencies-
to-say-bitcoins-offer-legitimate-benefits.html (quoting Mythili Raman, Acting Assistant 
Attorney General at Justice Department’s Criminal Division, at the Committee on Homeland 
Security and Governmental Affairs). 
 56. OFFICE SPACE (Twentieth Century Fox 1999). 
 57. Catherine Martin Christopher, Whack-a-Mole: Why Prosecuting Digital Currency 
Exchanges Won't Stop Online Laundering, 18 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1 (2014), available at 
https://law.lclark.edu/live/files/17113-lcb181art1christopherpdf. 
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3. The Public Ledger 
A third reason for the use of virtual currency is the public creation of a 
transfer ledger as part of the Bitcoin transfer process. Bitcoins cannot be 
transferred without a public key encrypted transfer ledger. Despite their 
reputation as anonymous, encrypted records of every transfer back to the 
initial creation of the currency exists and is public. It is very likely that 
these records will be (or have already been) decrypted to discover the 
record of their sale. This kind of ledger paradoxically makes the laundering 
of virtual currency or purchase of illicit goods much riskier than certain 
international money transfer procedures. 
This should be a boon to law enforcement agencies who seek to 
understand the flow of the black market. Even assuming that the identities 
of the transferors remains anonymous, the raw data regarding transfer is 
available publicly. This will enable the research into the extremely 
nebulous and difficult-to-penetrate world of the illegal marketplace. Merely 
the existence of this public ledger will benefit law enforcement as it will 
offer insights into areas where enforcement is lax, or where resources 
would be more efficiently applied. 
Another benefit to law enforcement in the virtual currency is the ease by 
which this value may be seized. Currently, the largest single owner of 
bitcoins, after the creator, is the FBI.58 Seized from illegal TOR networks, 
bitcoins can be obtained by physically seizing the servers on which the 
wallets are held, or virtually, by forcing a transfer of publicly available 
bitcoins. Law enforcement agencies with jurisdiction need only probable 
cause to seize property connected with criminal enterprise, and as the 
technology to track sales and the identities of users develops, methods to 
seize Coins that have been used to facilitate illicit sales will become 
routine. If routine seizure of Coins used in illicit transactions becomes 
standard, the cost of using virtual currency to engage in illegal activity will 
rise. 
Traditional money laundering techniques generally cost about 10% of the 
money to be cleansed. Thus, law enforcement needs only to find and seize a 
relatively small portion of the money used in illegal transfers before the 
costs rise to a level that will deter virtual currency from being used in this 
                                                                                                                 
 58. Press Release, FBI, Manhattan U.S. Attorney Announces Seizure of Additional $28 
Million Worth of Bitcoins Belonging to Ross William Ulbricht, Alleged Owner and Operator 
of “Silk Road” Website (Oct. 25, 2013), available at http://www.fbi.gov/newyork/press-
releases/2013/manhattan-u.s.-attorney-announces-seizure-of-additional-28-million-worth-of-
bitcoins-belonging-to-ross-william-ulbricht-alleged-owner-and-operator-of-silk-road-website. 
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fashion. I will elucidate in a future article the methods by which this may be 
achieved. 
4. Cryptographic Security and Account Protection 
If a Bitcoin is stolen, the only loss has been the value of the coin. It 
exists as a unit of exchange itself, and not an account or balance. The 
amount of value that can be lost to a hacker is limited to the amount that is 
kept online, while those kept in offline “wallets,” which are really just 
computer memory storage units kept unconnected to the internet, cannot be 
seized. While there are other ways of potentially taking offline Coins, 
having an upper bound on loss can be comforting. 
The pure technological marvel of virtual currency is exciting. The 
implementation of the Bitcoin and the cryptographic ideas embodied within 
are fascinating and ingenious. The use of virtual currency embodies, for 
some in the technical community, the radical democratization and anti-
authoritarian ideology that techno-futurists covet.59 Whether these goals are 
laudable or misguided is beyond the scope of this article. 
B. What Disadvantages Do Bitcoins Have? 
1. Theft 
The major downside of virtual currency is the other side of the coin to its 
major advantage: the ease of transfer makes them easily stolen. There is 
very little consumer protection at any level of a Bitcoin transaction. Losses 
from theft, fraud, or failure to live up to a contract will generally go 
unrecovered. 
Bitcoins can be attacked in several methods.   The most dangerous point 
of contact is in the exchange, when Bitcoins are offered up for sale and can 
be transferred at this point. This has led to some commentators to believe 
that regulation should focus on the exchange phase.  Bitcoins themselves 
enjoy 128-bit public-key security: they are equally secure as any encrypted 
website or online purchase in terms of pure cryptography. The issues that 
have arisen have all been human error. Mt. Gox and FlexCoin were badly 
programed for security.60 The owners of the sites probably committed 
criminal malfeasance leading to the losses from the sites. 61 Poorly picked 
                                                                                                                 
 59. Sarah Jeong, The Bitcoin Protocol as Law, and the Politics of a Stateless Currency, 
SSRN (May 8, 2013), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2294124. 
 60. Leaked code purported to belong to Flexcoin shows key failures to meet industry-
standards regarding privacy. The first warning sign may have been when the secret passkeys 
for customer’s Coins were used as plaintext web addresses. 
 61. Greene v. MtGox Inc., No. 1:14-cv-1437 Doc. 1, at 5 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 27, 2014). 
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passwords and sloppy programming account for the vast majority of stolen 
Bitcoins. Once stolen, Bitcoins are effectively gone and cannot be returned, 
even though the block chain has recorded the theft. 
In early November of 2013, researchers at Cornell University published a 
paper asserting that the virtual currency can be broken if the system of 
mining algorithms can be successfully exploited by a group of sufficiently 
selfish miners who obtain a majority control of the current mining pool. 62  
Authorities in the United States have cracked down on the criminal use 
of virtual currencies in a few cases, but those have been isolated situations 
in which the coins have been used for illegal purposes in the real world, like 
money laundering and trade in illicit goods. The owner of the Silk Road, a 
website where drugs and weapons could be bought with Bitcoins, was 
arrested earlier this year after attempting to procure an assassination of a 
business rival.63 
But for crimes contained within the Bitcoin network — like thefts from 
apparently reputable online wallets where Bitcoins are stored — there has 
been almost no accountability. 
Unauthorized transfer of bitcoins is very easy when few precautions are 
taken, but can be made extremely difficult if some relatively 
straightforward precautions are put into place. Bitcoins are secured using 
Public Key Infrastructure (PKI), which simply means that some encryption 
code – a “private key” or password - is established for every public Bitcoin 
address, and that private key must be used to decrypt and spend Bitcoins. 
This private key is really nothing more than a text file with gibberish 
written inside. Theft occurs when an unauthorized user accesses that text 
file, which enables them to spend the bitcoin. Theft is by far the biggest 
security vulnerability. But loss is also a concern; there have been many 
instances of individuals accidentally losing the private keys that allow them 
to spend their Bitcoins. If the text file is deleted with no backups, the 
bitcoin cannot be spent, and the result is that it becomes useless and loses 
its value.  
Exchanges face more problems, because they are known sites offering 
continually available Coins. On March 2, 2014 Flexcoin was attacked and 
robbed of all coins in the hot wallet. The attacker made off with 896 BTC 
transferring them into two anonymous addresses. Flexcoin released a notice 
that simply stating that, because it did “not have the resources, assets, or 
                                                                                                                 
 62. Ittay Eyal & Emin Gun Sirer, Majority Is Not Enough: Bitcoin Mining Is 
Vulnerable, CORNELL UNIV. LIBRARY ARXIV.ORG (Nov. 15, 2013), http://arxiv.org/pdf/1311. 
0243v5.pdf. 
 63. Paid in Bitcoin, naturally. 
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otherwise to come back from this loss, [the Flexcoin exchange would close 
its] doors immediately.” A small notice in the terms of use offered the 
following cryptic waiver of liability: “Legal Notice: We are not a true bank 
that accepts USD or any national currency, only bitcoins which by their 
nature are not regulated, we’re not FDIC insured or regulated by any 
government entity.” The Alberta-based Flexcoin simply declared 
bankruptcy after determining that two of its accounts had been hacked. 
The largest exchange, Mt. Gox, which had been losing Coins over the 
course of several months, first deducted their losses from customer 
accounts, and then declared bankruptcy. Being based in Japan, where 
virtual currency is looked upon unfavorably, chances of customers 
obtaining recourse are slim. 
The largest Bitcoin payment processor in Europe, BIPS, has been hacked 
for a loss of about $1 million worth of Bitcoins, including coins that were in 
the personal online wallets of customers. The company,stated that it would 
be “unable to reimburse Bitcoins lost unless the stolen coins are retrieved.” 
While Danish police were examining the case BIPS further stated that the 
authorities could “not classify this as a theft due to the current 
nonregulation of Bitcoin.”64 
The People’s Bank of China, among five Chinese agencies released a 
notice that they would not use virtual currency that citizens of the country 
would still be allowed to buy and sell, but it warned that participants 
“assume the risks themselves.”65 This lack of protection is likely a 
calculated disincentive for the use of virtual currency in China, ensuring 
that Chinese banks retain tight control of the Yuan.66 
Fraud may also be (and has been) perpetrated by an exchange client: an 
exchange sends money to a client, but the client says that they never 
received it; when the exchange tries to find the transaction using the Bitcoin 
hash, which is the record in the block chain that allows you to identify the 
transaction, the exchange cannot find it because it has been changed by the 
client. Since the exchange cannot find the hash, their program assumes 
there was an error with their system and a second transfer is attempted. 
                                                                                                                 
 64. Nathaniel Popper, In the Murky World of Bitcoin, Fraud Is Quicker Than the Law, 
N.Y TIMES, Dec. 5, 2013, http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/12/05/in-the-murky-world-of-
bitcoin-fraud-is-quicker-than-the-law/?_php=true&_type=blogs&_r=0. 
 65. Monetary Policy Analysis Grp. of the People’s Bank of China, China Monetary 
Policy Report: Quarter Four, 2013 (Feb. 8, 2014), available at http://www.pbc.gov.cn:8080/ 
image_public/UserFiles/english/upload/File/2013MPR-afterNancy(1).pdf 
 66. Lou Yao-xiong, Wu Jun, Analysis of Legal Issues of Bitcoin, 15 J. BEIJING UNIV. 
POSTS & TELECOMMUNICATIONS 25 (2013) (Social Sciences Edition). 
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Dishonest clients may use this fraud to double and triple dip while rapidly 
sending the command withdrawing their money, receiving consecutive 
transfers. This vulnerability is known as “malleability.” While this 
vulnerability of the Bitcoin protocol allowing this type of fraud has been 
known for several years, and the Bitcoin Foundation has offered protocol 
fixes that prevent properly-run exchanges from facing this fraud, several 
exchanges have been bankrupted after the fix was released. Mt. Gox and 
FlexCoin operated a version of the protocol that inadequately addressed the 
malleability issue. However, malleability should no longer be considered an 
exploitable problem, despite many exchanges confirming malleability 
thefts. 
There has already been one major possible attack on Bitcoin elaborated, 
which would involve one person obtaining control of a major portion of the 
Coin mining computer network and maliciously holding back portions of 
the block chain. This attack, while potentially serious, is beyond the scope 
of the article, except to note in passing that other attacks may be discovered 
in the future that pose significant risks to the currency. 
The risk of theft, where liability should fall, and what waivers consumers 
can be expected to accept will be discussed below. 
2. Poor Speed and Excessive Resource Use 
The second major downside of Bitcoins, and any currently foreseeable 
virtual currency, is its inefficiency. Bitcoins are tremendously inefficient in 
three ways: Time, Computing Resources, and Transmission Data. Coins 
“cost” a lot of computing power to simulate trust by brute-force solving 
algorithms to verify trades.67 This uses a massive amount of energy; and to 
encourage users to make this sacrifice, users must be paid in inflationary 
currency. Bitcoin is far less efficient than our current banking and credit 
card system for most trades. No transfer can take place without the brute 
force computations to verify the transfer, which means they must always 
take more time than a single-point transfer will. Lowering the time it takes 
to make such a transfer would be untenable, as it would open the Bitcoin up 
to several vulnerabilities that would render them useless. Unfortunately, 
Coins will always cost resources to transfer, and those resources must 
always be paid by (presumably neutral) third-parties. Those parties must be 
paid, either through inflation or direct payment, in order for the system to 
function. 
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When you distribute the business ledger, you can no longer simply talk 
to a single point of authority (as exists for credit card transactions, 
elaborated above), and all transactions must wait until they are verified by 
anonymous other players on the network. Instead of it taking a few 
milliseconds, it takes several minutes to get back an answer. Transactions in 
Bitcoin are designed to take about ten minutes to process, and attempts to 
speed this up would make the system insecure. Less time would permit 
double-spending of bitcoins or permit users with large relative computing 
power to solve multiple transfers without publicly verifying them and 
ruining the network by thereby destroying the incentive for others on the 
network to verify transfers.68  
Currently, Coin trading volume is low, but the volume of trading has 
little effect on the timing or resource costs of Bitcoin. Again, it is the 
double-edged sword of virtual currency that all “costs” of a transfer remain 
fixed, whether the payment is for one dollar or one million dollars. Whether 
trading volume is low or high, the protocol itself is limited to 7 transactions 
per second. For comparison, a major retailer could engage in 5,000 
transactions per second on Black Friday. Wal-Mart’s 10 million 
transactions between 8 p.m. and midnight on Black Friday of 2012 would 
take Bitcoin system more than 800 days to record.69 Bitcoins must remain 
limited to relatively infrequent purchasing systems, which again make them 
useful for globalized product purchases and not much else. 
3. Third Party Mining 
The last problem with Bitcoins is that they require third parties to do 
work in order to generate the block chain. The third party computers brute-
force a cryptographic solution to the problem posed by the transaction, 
which has been summarized to the public as “solving difficult math 
problems.” In order to incentivize third parties to use their resources, this 
stage of the transaction has been termed mining, because miners receive 
payments of new Bitcoins for successfully solving the math problems. New 
                                                                                                                 
 68. Matthias Herrmann, Implementation, Evaluation and Detection of a Doublespend-
Attack on Bitcoin (Apr. 24, 2012) (unpublished Master’s thesis, Department of Computer 
Science, ETH Zürich, available at http://e-collection.library.ethz.ch/eserv/eth:5606/eth-5606-
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Bitcoins are generated when miners solve a transaction and the miner owns 
those new Bitcoins.70 
If virtual currency becomes widespread, new developments either in 
technology, in law, or agreements by major institutions, will be required to 
solve the 51% problem identified by cryptographers.71 
Currently, mining generates a tremendous amount of money (in the form 
of Bitcoins). The temptation to create value merely by expending computer 
processing power is so great that there exists a market for Bitcoin mining 
computers.72 There are also already criminal hackers who have used 
computers in an unauthorized manner in order to mine Bitcoins. A New 
Jersey software company created a botnet to mine coins.73 And a computer 
science student at Harvard exceeded his authorization to use a 
supercomputer to mine Dogecoins.74 
Presently 3,600 bitcoins are created per day, which totals to 1,314,000 
new Coins each year. This means Bitcoin currently has a monetary inflation 
rate of over 10% per annum. All of the new Coins are owned by the miners 
to incentivize them to process and verify other users’ transactions. There 
are about 60,000 transactions per day on the bitcoin network. That accounts 
for an upper bound of 4,000 new coins created per day, if blocks are 
confirmed slightly quicker than an average of ten minutes each. For each 
transaction on the bitcoin network, miners receive 1/15th of a bitcoin. 
When bitcoin was worth $1,000 each miner earned $66 in virtual currency 
for every network transaction they solved. 
                                                                                                                 
 70. A. Bogliolo, P. Polidori, A. Aldini, W. Moreira, P. Mendes, M. Yildiz, C. Ballester 
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Ultimately, it costs the network from $40 to $70 per transaction, in the 
form of inflation. Compare this to normal credit cards, where the average 
transaction fee is $2 or $3. Bitcoin transactions cost up to 20 times as much 
as credit card transactions. Right now, this cost is being masked through 
monetary inflation. Take the inflation out of the system, and all of those 
costs would have to be paid in transaction fees. This economic system can 
never achieve stability.75 
There are methods of mitigating or eliminating this aspect of virtual 
currency,76 but public ledger virtual currencies can never completely 
eliminate the tragedy of the commons and all transfers between peers will 
require that others do work for their benefit.77 It may be that a system of 
contracts or traditional arrangements will come into shape similar to the 
EFT network that currently exists between banks.78 
III.  Virtual Currency: Currency, Commodity, or Contract? 
A. Currency? 
To begin thinking generally about the regulatory schemes we may 
envision, let us first determine what we are discussing. Having provided a 
general overview of the Bitcoin, what it is and how it works, let us try to 
categorize it.  
A Bitcoin doesn’t have any backing government or even regulatory body 
protecting its value or ensuring its legitimate use. This is the most obvious 
distinction against its being considered a currency. It has not been issued by 
any governmental body, or even an organization with quasi-authoritarian 
status.79 Additionally, it is not used with the level of frequency or 
confidence to be considered a means of transaction. It is not a currency. 
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Eric Posner believes Bitcoins are a form of commodity; albeit one 
unregulated by the government: 
 There is a long history of unregulated currencies. Gold has 
been an unregulated currency at various times and in various 
places. In prison camps, cigarettes have served as currency. In 
the United States in the 19th Century, in some states, the 
currency was basically unregulated; people would set up banks 
that issued bank notes that circulated. Sometimes you get an 
unregulated currency simply because there is no government. 
Sometimes you get an unregulated currency because there is a 
government but it does not control the money supply very well 
or the government is corrupt and people do not trust the official 
currency. Bitcoin just seems to be another version of this. It is a 
lot like gold, in fact. The difference, of course, is that it is digital 
rather than a heavy, unwieldy object. That means that it could 
serve the same purposes as gold in terms of a currency, but much 
more efficiently because it does not have any mass and can be 
sent easily from place to place.80 
Posner has some legal precedent on his side: A Texas federal district 
court ruled that Bitcoins were a currency for the purpose of determining 
jurisdiction.81 But the most commonly used definitions of currency: Is the 
currency widely accepted as a medium of exchange and does it share a 
common value? In the case of Bitcoins, both definitions must be considered 
flexibly. Bitcoins are widely accepted as medium of exchange in sheer 
geographic area (they have been used in forty countries at least), which puts 
them in a different arena than pseudo-currencies like cigarettes or company 
script. And they share a common value in the sense that their purported fair 
market value is available on a live exchange at all times. But this is not the 
whole story. 
FinCEN’s regulations define currency (also referred to as “real” 
currency) as “the coin and paper money of the United States or of any other 
country that [i] is designated as legal tender and that [ii] circulates and [iii] 
is customarily used and accepted as a medium of exchange in the country of 
                                                                                                                 
 80. Interview with Eric Posner, TOP OF MIND (Goldman Sachs Global Investment 
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issuance.”82 The IRS has also come out against Bitcoins’ status as 
currency.83 
In my judgment Bitcoins are not currency because they do not represent 
stable measurements of value. The value of a Bitcoin is far too speculative 
to be considered currency. Bitcoins famously have an upper bound built 
into the system: By 2024 no new Bitcoins will be made and all mining 
payments will be done through payment of existing Bitcoins.  This is 
designed to prevent runaway inflation.  
Believers in this system tend to underestimate the costs. “Big miners and 
mining pools would be stupid to do things that undermine confidence in 
bitcoin and make their investment worth less. I predict history will repeat 
itself, and the current panic over GHash.IO will self-correct over the next 
few weeks.”84 But the booms and crashes in the currency, reflecting its 
speculative value, belie the truth. 
In effect, Bitcoin can never be a currency because its value can never 
achieve stability. Disregarding the lack of a stabilizing central bank, even in 
an ideal free market the pressures inherent to the Bitcoin will necessarily 
create radical price differences on a continual basis. My theory has thus far 
been borne out by the bubble, bust, and recovery of Bitcoins to date. With 
no stable measure of value, Bitcoins can never be used as currency. 
B. Commodity? 
Is Bitcoin a commodity? It has more characteristics in common with 
commodities than with currency, except for the most essential: It has no 
inherent value.  Virtual property can have value,85 but the natural value of 
Bitcoin is nothing, or close to nothing, and values above equivalent 
transactions fees on arbitrage are purely speculative. 
“Commodity” defines any item that “accommodates” our physical wants 
and needs. And one of these physical wants is the need for a store of value. 
Throughout history humans have used different commodities as a store of 
value (cocoa beans, pork bellies, oranges, or most commonly: gold).86 In 
contrast, a security is any instrument that is “secured” against something 
                                                                                                                 
 82. 31 C.F.R. 1010.100(m) (2011). 
 83. IRS Pub. Notice 2014-21 (2014), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-drop/n-14-
21.pdf. 
 84. Robert McMillan, Bitcoin Stares Down Impending Apocalypse (Again), WIRED (Jan. 
10, 2014), http://www.wired.com/2014/01/ghash/ (inteview with Gary Andresen). 
 85. Bragg v. Linden Research, Inc., 487 F. Supp. 2d 593 (E.D. Penn. 2007). 
 86. Dominic Wilson & Jose Ursua, Is Bitcoin a Currency? No, TOP OF MIND (Goldman 
Sachs Global Investment Research Paper), Mar. 11, 2014, Issue 21, at 6. 
2014]        REGULATORY OVERVIEW OF VIRTUAL CURRENCY 27 
 
 
else. As a currency is usually secured by a commodity or a government’s 
ability to tax and defend, it is considered to be a security. By these 
definitions, bitcoin is a commodity, and not a currency, while Bitcoin with 
a capital “B” is the technology, or network, that bitcoin moves across.87 The 
analogy would be Shale technology versus shale oil. 
Still, bitcoins can be sold as investment instruments. A Southlake oil and 
gas company ran afoul of Texas securities regulators after raising capital 
through the bitcoin.88 The Texas State Securities Board ordered Balanced 
Energy to stop selling securities on the grounds that it had failed to disclose 
to its investors the risk of financing operations through a virtual currency 
subject to large fluctuations in value.89 Clearly virtual currency can achieve 
value if intrinsically tied to some other, real value or venture. In such cases, 
virtual currency is a form of readily traded stock or method of establishing 
ownership of a more traditional commodity, like oil or gold. 
 
It is almost universally accepted that any commodity that would 
make a good store of value should be stable over time (non-
reactive). Though not as stable as gases, gold and other precious 
metals are the least reactive elements that are in solid form. 
Bitcoin is “reactive” since software change has occurred in the 
past. There are thousands of bitcoin miners that maintain the 
Bitcoin network by using their computing power to verify 
transactions and place them in a block chain. If a majority of this 
computing power switched their software to adopt a change, then 
effectively that new software would become the standard and 
any verification using the old software would be rejected. Gold 
also has nearly no competing substitutes that can erode its value. 
Silver is more reactive and plentiful than gold. Palladium is far 
less dense. While platinum can compete with gold on most 
physical attributes, it is too rare and has catalytic properties that 
bid it away from investment demand. Competition is likely 
bitcoin’s weakest point, as its position was only secured by being 
the first mover. However, primary competitors – Litecoin and 
Ripple – are not yet a serious threat. Litecoin is bitcoin’s silver 
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and is less valuable and secure. Ripple is an exchange that 
supports multiple commodities including bitcoin, gold and 
silver.90 
I say this because, as far as I can see, the only true value of a virtual 
currency is the ease with which it can be used in payment, both intra and 
internationally. Virtual currency, as I’ve said above, easily facilitates 
international payments and avoids several costs and delays that come with 
traditional international banking. The difference between these costs and 
the cost of using a method of virtual currency are the value of that virtual 
currency, and a Bitcoin can be said to have this value. In a world like ours 
today, where the costs of international payment are high and the costs of 
using a virtual currency are (theoretically) low, Bitcoin technology, and 
thus bitcoins, have some inherent absolute value. 
C. Contracts Transferring IP 
But how should we consider this economic value? I’ve already explained 
why Bitcoins are not currency, nor are they commodities. They are best 
thought of as contracts stipulating the creation and ownership of new 
intellectual property. The promise to send someone a Bitcoin is a service, 
and the newly created serial number hash is a new copyright. Bitcoins are 
more similar to contracts for loans or expense accounts than they are to 
mechanisms of finance or securities. This means that regulatory agencies 
that start from the preconception of regulating methods of international 
commerce are destined to fail unless they begin with an a priori framework 
of international contract and IP protection. Some authors have argued that 
online property should be held to traditional property law forms for mere 
simplicity; that permitting electronic ownership to be governed by contract 
would be conceptually difficult to function.91 While this means such 
considerations are more difficult initially, once such mechanisms are in 
place they will be very easy to modify and adapt as technology advances or 
methods of use change.92 
                                                                                                                 
 90. Currie, supra note 87. 
 91. Juliet M. Moringiello. Towards a System of Estates in Virtual Property. SSRN (July 
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The protected material of a Bitcoin is the gibberish saved in the text file 
that the current owner possesses.93 This text file can be used to hash a new 
file when the Coin is transferred, kept safe and hidden offline to store the 
bitcoin, or sent to an online currency exchange that will hold the bitcoin in 
trust. Random characters on a text file can certainly enjoy the same 
copyright protections94 as an original novel.95 Fixation may take the form of 
printed zeros and ones.96 The originality requirement is more than satisfied, 
because the random numbers are indeed the result of pseudorandom 
processes, the hashing of which takes systematic effort by the worker’s 
computer.97 
The Copyright Act grants copyright owners the exclusive right “to 
prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work.”98 Congress 
defined derivative works as those “based upon one or more preexisting 
works, such as a translation, musical arrangement, dramatization, 
fictionalization, motion picture version, sound recording, art reproduction, 
abridgment, condensation, or any other form in which a work may be 
recast, transformed, or adapted.”99  Works “consisting of editorial revisions, 
annotations, elaborations, or other modifications which, as a whole, 
represent an original work of authorship” are also considered “derivative 
works.”100 The derivative work right can stretch to the point where the 
                                                                                                                 
 93. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (“Literary works” are works, other than audiovisual works, 
expressed in words, numbers, or other verbal or numerical symbols or indicia, regardless of 
the nature of the material objects, such as books, periodicals, manuscripts, phonorecords, 
film, tapes, disks, or cards, in which they are embodied). 
 94. Id. § 102(a) (copyright protection subsists, in accordance with this title, in original 
works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now known or later 
developed, from which they can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, 
either directly or with the aid of a machine or device). 
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& R Prods. Co., 787 F. 2d 1208 (8th Circ. 1986); see also Bleistein v. Donaldson 
Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239 (1903). 
 98. 17 U.S.C. § 106(2). 
 99. Id. § 101. 
 100. Id. 
30 10 OKLA. J.L. & TECH. 70 (2014)  [Vol. 10 
 
 
resulting work bears little resemblance to the original.101 Thus, the 
derivative work right prohibits “the unauthorized use of expressive 
elements in subsequent works, regardless of whether such use involves any 
‘copying’ in the ordinary sense of the term.”102  Accordingly, person who 
has no authority to make a derivative work cannot copyright such a work.103 
Each time a Bitcoin is transferred and the hash chain is extended, a new 
derivative work is created.  Although the derivatives are created by the 
former owners, transferor, and miners, the derivatives are all owned by the 
person who owns the copyright in the original work.  That person is 
necessarily the transferee---i.e., the new owner of the Bitcoin. The prior 
owners still own their works, but those works are random characters on a 
text file that have no value anymore because they cannot be used to make 
further payments.104 Only the latest version of the Coin (the one that has 
been publicly verified as the latest on the block chain) is the work of IP 
with any value. The owner of the derivative work does not legally prejudice 
the original owner’s ownership of the underlying work, but in practical fact 
the creation of a new Coin upon transfer renders them unable to use the 
Coin they possess. 
Obviously, all parties working in the Bitcoin network have agreed (by 
virtue of their entrance into the system) that they disclaim ownership of the 
Coins they create for transfer. The new Coins are created pursuant to the 
terms of the sales contract that has been agreed to prior to the creation of 
the Coin.105 Thus, the agreement to sell something in exchange for a Bitcoin 
necessarily includes the understanding that the Buyer will create a 
derivative work upon transfer. The block chain created by miners is the 
paid-for addition to a compilation for which they disclaim any rights by 
publication.106 
Bitcoins, in their current form, comfortably fit into the realm of written 
works for which copyright protection applies upon creation. Bitcoin hash 
numbers are the material to be protected. They are unique, created by 
                                                                                                                 
 101. See, e.g., Castle Rock Entmt., Inc. v. Carol Publ’g Group, Inc., 150 F.3d 132, 138 
(2d Cir. 1998)  (finding the fact that a quiz book could infringe the Seinfeld television 
series). 
 102. Lateef Mtima, So Dark the Con(tu) of Man: The Quest for a Software Derivative 
Work Right in Section 117, 70 U. PITT. L. REV. 1, 57 (2008). 
 103. Gracen v. Bradford Exch., 698 F.2d 300, 303 (7th Cir. 1983). 
 104. See, e.g., Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730 (1989). 
 105. See Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Dumas, 53 F.3d 549 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 
1010 (1995); Dumas with Schiller & Schmidt, Inc. v. Nordisco Corp., 969 F. 2d 410 (7th 
Cir. 1992) (Posner, J.). 
 106. N.Y. Times Co., Inc. v. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483 (2001). 
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resource-intensive processes, and each Bitcoin is created for commercial 
purposes. Ownership lasts beyond the useful life of the Coin.  
Sales contracts can also include speculative venture.107 Bitcoins are not 
illusive; they clearly have some value and even just the transmission of 
random code is worth enough to the transferee that such contracts are not 
illusive. The property right for this kind of virtual currency does not exist 
until the new Coin comes into being; once the transfer has been confirmed 
and the transferee seizes the new Coin hash number.108 Purchases fall into 
the jurisdiction of traditional contract law: they are a swap of whatever the 
buyer is making in exchange for a promise to generate IP under the seller’s 
employ. 
IV. Present and Future Regulatory Scheme of Virtual Currency 
A. Current Regulatory Environment 
1. Legal Use of Virtual Currency 
The US Constitution109 and the Stamp Payments Act of 1862110 give the 
Federal Government the exclusive authority to create official coinage and 
currency of the United States. Printing a currency that is meant to compete 
with or confuse people about which is the legal tender is a crime.111 But the 
use of bartering, prepaid cards and other stores of value and virtual 
currency is permitted as long as applicable laws are complied with.112 The 
notion of lenity and general usage indicates that the creation and promotion 
of virtual currency does not violate any current statutes.113 Contracts 
stipulating payment in virtual currency simply specify the method by which 
value established upon the U.S. dollar is to be paid.114 
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However, there is currently no regulatory scheme to protect consumers 
of virtual currency, nor is there a system to prevent virtual currency from 
being used to buy illicit goods or launder money. The current applicable 
laws are as follows. 
There is the general protection against hacking. Federal laws prevent 
unauthorized computer entry. Notably, because Bitcoins are not money, 
theft of them from computers is more violative because of the unauthorized 
entry than because of the theft. It would be interesting to see prosecution 
against a Bitcoin thief, as the prosecutor would have difficulty establishing 
the fair market value of such an intangible. Unlike most software, there is 
no readily identifiable fair market value because the frequency of trade is so 
low and there is no centralized producer offering goods for regular sale. It 
would be like attempting to determine the fair market value of a particular 
stock when trading occurred rarely and through disparate, unknown parties. 
It would be more productive to charge the suspect for the mere act of 
exceeding their authority and engaging in fraud,115 or into a computer 
involved in a financial institution, such as a virtual currency exchange.116 
Additional applicable statutes include, of course, federal prohibitions 
against money laundering, and state regulatory schemes under the federal 
Banking Secrecy Act. The use of Bitcoin in such a scheme is problematic. 
In the event that the malleability problems  (“the 51% problem”) 
plaguing virtual currency becomes widespread, it is possible that antitrust 
penalties imposed by the Department of Justice will be the only source of 
relief for the aggrieved public.117 
2. Illegal Use of Virtual Currency 
It is feared that new methods of virtual currency will “help criminals 
launder massive amounts of money. More girls will be sold as sex slaves, 
more rhinos will be poached, and every other large-scale transnational 
crime that you can name is going to become a lot easier if criminals have a 
way to transfer very large amounts of money completely anonymously.”118  
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Some countries, such as Denmark and China, have already announced 
that stolen bitcoins are not going to be investigated. The risks lie entirely on 
the consumers if their meaningless gibberish files are lost, stolen, or 
corrupted. But even this system is untenable in the long term. Capital 
ventures are being funded through virtual currency already, illicit purchases 
are being tendered, and insurance companies may be called upon to pay for 
losses in virtual currency. Simply ignoring them or calling them prima facie 
without value is a blasé to the current state of reality, and will become 
ludicrously neglectful if virtual currencies continue to develop. 
This neglect will create geographical “black holes” where virtual 
currency is nether protected nor investigated, which will in turn lead to their 
increased use in illicit purchases and to launder money from other 
countries. The existence of these regulatory black spots must be ended or 
overcome by the United States if virtual currency can continue to be used 
productively but under the banner of the law. I propose the following 
developments to ensure that virtual currency does not become synonymous 
with illegality. 
B. Future Regulatory Development 
1. How Virtual Currency as IP Logically Orders the System 
If we consider each virtual currency transaction to be a contract 
obligating one party to the creation of intellectual property owned by the 
other party, a conception of the ideal regulatory scheme becomes more 
comprehensible. It also makes obvious how attempts to regulate virtual 
currencies as forms of currency or commodity are inadequate. 
To regulate virtual currency as a form of commodity would be to 
regulate the speculation of an item of trivial value. Once the market 
stabilizes on virtual currency, proposed regulatory framework will become 
redundant. The recent price bubble of Bitcoins is a byproduct of several 
recent developments, but any proposed legislative solution would be 
unnecessary at this time. I reject the regulation of Bitcoins in particular and 
virtual currency in general in the commodity arena as an unnecessary 
solution to a nonexistent problem. I remain open to modifying this assertion 
if digital currencies remain at their hyper-inflated price points beyond their 
current status as novelties. 
How much SEC involvement would be tolerated or desirable in virtual 
currency? To consider virtual currency a security would likely engender 
regulatory barriers sufficient to destroy the system in its nascent form and 
lock out future development. Might Bitcoins be considered securities, 
though? Certainly, their nominal price is based almost purely on their 
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speculative value. And the broad definition under the ’33 and ’34 Acts may 
encompass at least some offers to sell virtual currency.119 
The problem lies with the “Supreme Court’s apparent inability to 
comprehend thoroughly and to address analytically, consistently with the 
language, legislative history, and underlying policies of the securities acts, 
the important issues of federal securities regulation.”120 
The Bitcoin network as a whole may have been created in order to sell 
retained bitcoins once the price increased. But if Satoshi Nakamoto is truly 
the creator of Bitcoin, they were not created in a speculative venture but 
instead from a love of cryptography and the ease of payment opportunities 
it offered. The Bitcoin publication documents certainly do not “offer or 
endorse” bitcoins as securities or investment contracts.121 The increase in 
bitcoin prices seems to be a surprise to the creators. A Bitcoin is more like a 
collectable trading card than a stock. It is more like an antique chair than a 
real estate venture. The fact that the price has increased after the initial sale 
is not reason enough to consider the entire product line to be a security. 
Still, form is less important than economic reality when defining whether 
an investment contract or note is in fact a security (and thus merits SEC 
protection).122 Are not bitcoins a profit-seeking venture to which clients 
undertake a certain amount of risk? Certainly, those who buy bitcoins with 
dollars risk their capital: The market price for Coins may decrease or they 
may be unable to find subsequent purchasers to whom they may sell their 
Coins. But are Bitcoin purchasers buying an investment, or consuming 
digital goods?123 Bitcoins may not have much utility, but they are not 
themselves instruments dependent on the efforts of others.124 And once 
bitcoins are purchased, there is no vertical common enterprise between the 
promotor and the new owner; each new owner no longer needs to maintain 
a relationship with the old owner, and the transferor’s duty to and 
ownership of the transferee’s new coin is nil. And there is no horizontal 
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commonality between bitcoin investors. Under any jurisdiction’s test, the 
Bitcoin network is not an investment scheme. 
However, certain sales of virtual currency, or virtual currencies based 
upon and backed by corporate interest certainly can be considered 
securities. In these cases, the virtual currency will look substantially similar 
to investment notes or other traditional investment contracts.125 I will 
discuss the implications of this kind of arrangement below. 
If we then resolve ourselves that Bitcoin hashes are original expression 
and thus properties protected under copyright, several necessary legal 
conclusions follow. First, the transmitted encryption is automatically 
protected under American law, and identical copies by others can be 
assumed to violate the original owner’s rights.  The authorship of a Bitcoin 
hash would be relatively easy to prove if one were to take the matter to 
court: They could simply enter the record created when they published the 
transfer.  Of course, this has the effect of negating the pseudo-anonymity 
for which Bitcoins are currently valued. This also means that damages can 
be calculated as follows in the event of loss due to theft or fraud. 
2. Calculating Damages 
Subsequent transferees from an initial unapproved transfer will receive a 
different hash, which renders their Bitcoin substantially distinct from the 
initial Bitcoin that was unlawfully taken. So the person seeking to recover 
damages for an unauthorized “taking” of their currency under the 
protections of copyright must find the actual identity of the primary 
transferee. If a suit is successful, because Bitcoins are unregistered by their 
nature statutory damages will be unavailable and the suitor must seek actual 
damages. The primary difficulty in proving actual damages will be in 
determining the true value of the lost Bitcoins because fair market value is 
deceptively illusive. Although public trading “prices” exist for Bitcoin, 
trading frequency is currently extremely limited except in periods of high 
volatility when prices change very rapidly. Thus, litigants will have to 
dispute about what the actual fair market value of the stolen coins were in 
every suit. Large thefts have historically coincided with dramatic price 
drops in the Bitcoin exchange. Additionally, the current difficulty in 
obtaining cash or goods for Bitcoins makes their real value particularly 
contentious. 
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Bitcoins offer the unique case where an exact replacement of the lost, 
stolen, or destroyed IP will fully restore the plaintiff. There have already 
been cases where defendants have been ordered to transfer bitcoins.126 
While injunctions ordering transfer of coins may be the preferred method of 
dealing with the situation, monetary damages need to be further normalized 
before definitive statements can be made. 
Theft of a bitcoin, or more precisely an unauthorized transfer of an 
owned Coin by accessing the Coin’s secret number and using it to generate 
a new hash in the new owner’s possession, can be difficult to trace and 
difficult to prove. But assuming a case comes to court in the near future, 
what value has the thief stolen, and what reparations will make the victim 
whole? 
If we think of the damages as relief for forms of copyright infringement, 
damages may be calculated as for any standard software infringement case. 
Statutory damages are unavailable because virtual currency is not a 
protected publication.127 Instead, courts would determine actual damages. 
Calculating damages by comparing the plaintiff’s income before and after 
the infringement would be very difficult to apply to Bitcoin theft, unless the 
plaintiff is engaged in widespread currency exchange (like a Mt. Gox).128 
Instead courts may calculate damages by based on what the copyright 
owner would have received had she sold or licensed the work instead of 
having it stolen. The only numbers that need to be determined are the 
number of infringements and the value of the work.  This still may be 
difficult, however, because of the problems associated with pricing a work 
if it has not been commercially sold (e.g. – a piece of original art from an 
artist’s private collection). Virtual currency will use this method of 
calculation for relief, although valuation would be more difficult than it 
may originally seem. 
Actual Damages are difficult to claim because the plaintiff must prove to 
the court that their amount claimed for Actual Damages is accurate.129  
Plaintiffs need forensic accountants testify as their expert witness, who are 
often opposed by forensic accountants for the defendants who can testify 
that the damages are lower than the plaintiff claims. Many records 
controlled by the plaintiff may become a part of the public record.  It is 
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possible to have the plaintiff’s financial records kept private from the 
general public (if the court is convinced there is good cause to do so), but 
the plaintiff will have no choice in turning over financial records to the 
opposing party. 
Plaintiffs with strong documentation showing lost profits have stronger 
cases than those without them; but bitcoins are sold only once. Historical 
sales records are very important for showing expected sales, but plaintiffs 
will only be able to show their sales of other Coins, or the market value of 
Coins sold at the time of the theft. In this case, the loss would be equal to 
the value of a future Bitcoin sale that has been stymied by the theft, less the 
original purchase price of the coin.130 This requires that the plaintiff make 
some kind of showing that they would have sold the Bitcoin at a particular 
time but for the theft. The value and timing could be calculated in a fashion 
similar to the damages assessed to plaintiffs in securities cases where 
plaintiffs were misled.  Any documentation that was done in the normal 
course of business will carry more weight than documents generated 
specifically for the infringement claim. 
In general, it seems that the remedies for lost virtual currency are 
currently inadequate, even forgoing for the moment the difficulty in 
tracking down the perpetrators in online theft. 
3. How the Current System is Inadequate 
The downsides of leaving this regime as-is are tremendous.131 Another 
objection, which is in my belief fatal to Bitcoins in their current form, is the 
fact that copyright protections render Bitcoins extremely vulnerable to 
overseas theft. There is very little agreement between the United States and 
other countries where Bitcoins are primarily traded, and obtaining 
protection for original expression in foreign jurisdictions can be arduous 
and take longer than a similarly placed foreign transfer of funds. 
Remember, in this article I consider Bitcoins’ primary competition to be 
regulated bank transfers. A second objection under copyright would be the 
privacy aspect. Remember how one of the benefits of Bitcoin is the public 
transfer chain, with encrypted names of transferors. However, in order to 
press ownership under an IP regime, transferors would have to make their 
transfer and the encryption used to create the hash key public. This not only 
reveals the formerly-anonymous transferor, but also makes it much more 
likely that prior and subsequent bricks of the transfer chain can be 
                                                                                                                 
 130. Actual damages relieves only lost profits, not lost value. 
 131. Sarah Jeong, The Bitcoin Protocol as Law, and the Politics of a Stateless Currency, 
SSRN (May 8, 2013), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2294124. 
38 10 OKLA. J.L. & TECH. 70 (2014)  [Vol. 10 
 
 
discovered and their anonymity can be compromised. This is a significant 
disadvantage to Bitcoin protection and actually makes them less desirable 
than traditional banking transfers for those seeking some degree of 
anonymity.132 At best, plaintiffs would win the case by tracking down the 
thieves (already a difficult proposition) and after intensive fact-based 
litigation recover their actual damages by opening their accounting ledgers 
to the opposing parties. 
C. Proposed Regulations 
1. The Regulation of the Exchange E-Economy 
The major reason Bitcoin is unsustainable for wider adoption is the lack 
of government support. While the freedom promised by virtually exchanged 
and cryptographically backed money may be ideologically appealing, 
monetary relations are too closely interwoven with other economic, 
political and social relations to be managed well by any institution with less 
sway than a government.133 The detailed work of money creation can be 
delegated to independent central banks and to a credit system of regulated 
private banks, but the ultimate authority of any functioning monetary 
system will always be the ultimate political authority. 
Attempts to create private currency only succeed in spaces where there is 
no effective government: During revolutions, in remote geographical 
locations, or in the black market. These situations all use private currency 
only as a last resort. Bitcoin exemplifies some of the problems of private 
money: Its value is uncertain, its legal status is unclear, and it could easily 
become valueless if users lose faith. And there is a legitimate fear that if 
Bitcoin ever starts to demonstrate true market value, governments will 
either ban it or destroy its competitive advantage with overregulation.  
As the Bitcoin experiment develops the government should seek to foster 
its innovative advances while seeking to protect consumers and limit its 
potential use for illegal activity.134 The major structural framework I 
propose is to include virtual currency in the state and federal legislative 
framework as we consider the future of virtual currency. I will explicate in 
a later article my proposed format for the next generation of virtual 
currency, one which more closely resembles enforceable contracts.  To 
                                                                                                                 
 132. Reid & Harrigan, supra note 40. 
 133. Jim Harper, Understanding Regulators’ Warnings, BITCOIN FOUND. BLOG (Mar. 20, 
2014), https://bitcoinfoundation.org/2014/03/20/understanding-regulators-warnings/. 
 134. But see Auroracoin, the virtual currency that has been created and promulgated by 
the Icelandic government and distributed to its citizens.  AURORACOIN, http://auroracoin.org/ 
(last visited July 2, 2014). 
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regulate digital currencies as contracts of minute duration leads to elegant 
and worthwhile consequences. 
 
Initiation Processing 
Front-End Infrastructure Back-End Infrastructure Clearing 
Agencies 







Fig. 5: Traditional Money Transmission Network 
 
First, contract dispute between states and nations are relatively common 
and the body of protections and remedies is straightforward. Copyright 
protections are speculative and cannot be clearly envisioned at the time of 
transfer. Tort remedies for theft and misuse of the Bitcoin are similarly 
difficult to envision.  If virtual currency is going to be used by legitimate 
and risk-averse parties, the certainty and precognition available from 
contract remedies are essential. This works both ways: the transferor/owner 
will be able to predict future possible remedies from misuse or loss; and 
this helps those who seek to take coins of uncertain origin: They understand 
the absolute limits of their potential liability. The certainty for all 
participants from a legal standpoint is essential if virtual currency is going 
to be a respectable alternative to current transfers.  
Another positive benefit to virtual currency existing in the form of 
contract is the flexibility of such arrangements. It has proven remarkably 
easy to create virtual currency modeled after Bitcoin. Each derivative 
virtual currency has a unique reason for its existence and a unique chain of 
transfers leading back to an initial source. But there is no reason these 
currencies need to exist in perpetuity, and there is no reason the creation of 
a new currency needs to lead to new regulatory structure simply because the 
new currency features some option or feature that has not been anticipated 
by the existing regulatory scheme. Consider for example a new Bitcoin 
derivative, the GodloveCoin, which offers the feature of including call 
options from various banks around the world. This feature would baffle a 
regulator seeking to keep the market stable and free from illicit transactions 
under any proposed Bitcoin scheme. But under future disputes in court, 
considering the GodloveCoin in a contract litigation, the judge would 
simply rely on existing precedent at the time of the creation of the contract 
and apply the Bitcoin cases in an analogous manner. 
 
 
















Fig. 6: Proposed Bank-Backed Virtual Currency Transmission Structure 
 
Thus consider the Bitcoin and its progeny as forms of money 
transmission through value-infused software IP rather than currency or 
commodity. Contract allows the flourishing of virtual currency with as 
many names and functions as there are different needs between interested 
parties.  The production of such coins has been shown to be easy, and future 
production will become trivial. Such coins would exist until their purpose 
has been exhausted, and the use of these, with the call option on various 
banks, would allow the future Coins to be fully called once the transactions 
have been wrapped up. The call option can exist as long as the banks with 
which such Coins have been created in conjunction with exist. 
2. What Features Future Virtual Currency Must Include 
Messages can be embedded in the "coinbase" of a block. The Bitcoin 
genesis block contains the headline from the front page of a newspaper and 
subsequent user “Luke-Jr” used his Coin pool to embed Bible quotes and 
prayers into the block chain. In this fashion, regulations should exist that 
require certain information to be embedded in the block chain from the 
initial creation of the Coin. Federal law should be enacted that requires 
certain public statements to be embedded, which can be accessed by owners 
of the Coins once they own possession. Embedded messages can be either 
encrypted or unencrypted. A blanket requirement that certain information 
be included in all virtual currencies created and transferred is the minimum 




Owners Buyer's Bank 
2014]        REGULATORY OVERVIEW OF VIRTUAL CURRENCY 41 
 
 
Unencrypted messages should include the same kinds of disclosures that 
are currently required for users to create money transfer accounts, as well as 
some hybrid disclosures modeled on those required for initial public 
offerings of securities.  
At least one federal district court has found that it has subject matter 
jurisdiction over cryptocurrency pursuant to sections 20 and 22 of the 
Securities Act of 1933, and sections 21 and 27 of the Exchange Act of 
1934.135 The jurisdiction was created through the unique manner in which 
the virtual currency at issue was endorsed and offered. The court correctly 
determined that, in these circumstances, virtual currency can be sold as an 
investment contract and is therefore under SEC jurisdiction: 
 The term "security" is defined as "any note, stock, treasury 
stock, security future, security-based swap, bond ... [or] 
investment contract ..."[136] An investment contract is any 
contract, transaction, or scheme involving (1) an investment of 
money, (2) in a common enterprise, (3) with the expectation that 
profits will be derived from the efforts of the promoter or a third 
party.[137] First, the Court must determine whether the BTCST 
investments constitute an investment of money. It is clear that 
Bitcoin can be used as money. It can be used to purchase goods 
or services, and as Shavers stated, used to pay for individual 
living expenses. The only limitation of Bitcoin is that it is 
limited to those places that accept it as currency. However, it can 
also be exchanged for conventional currencies, such as the U.S. 
dollar, Euro, Yen, and Yuan. Therefore, Bitcoin is a currency or 
form of money, and investors wishing to invest in BTCST 
provided an investment of money. 
 Next, the Court looks at whether there is a common 
enterprise. To show a common enterprise, the Fifth Circuit 
requires interdependence between the investors and the 
promotor, which "may be demonstrated by the investors' 
collective reliance on the promotor's expertise even where the 
promotor receives only a flat fee or commission rather than a 
                                                                                                                 
 135. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Shavers, 4:13-CV-416, 2013 WL 4028182 (E.D. Tex. 
filed Aug. 6, 2013). 
 136. Id. at *2 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 77b). 
 137. Id. (quoting Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 298-99 
(1946)); Long v. Shultz Cattle Co., 881 F.2d 129, 132 (1989). 
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share in the profits of the venture." . . . .[138] That 
interdependence is established in this case because the investors 
here were dependent on Shavers' expertise in Bitcoin markets 
and his local connections.[139] In addition, Shavers allegedly 
promised a substantial return on their investments as a result of 
his trading and exchanging Bitcoin. Therefore, the Court finds 
that there is a common enterprise. 
 Finally, the Court considers whether there is an expectation 
that profits will be derived from the efforts of the promotor or 
third party. The Court finds that this prong is also met. At the 
outset, Shavers allegedly promised up to 1% interest daily, and 
at some point during the relevant period the interest promised 
was at 3.9%. Clearly any investors participating in the BTCST 
investments were expecting profits from the efforts of 
Shavers.140 
From the three factors, it is clear that Bitcoins were being sold as 
securities in this instance. In any future instances where cryptocurrencies 
are sold in similar fashions, the SEC should indeed gain jurisdiction to 
proceed. However, this is not a radical step. The SEC has jurisdiction over 
sales of real estate, rental property, and cooperative ventures, if they are 
sold in a form that resembles speculative contracts or other common 
enterprises for profit.141 But it should be clear from these factors that sale of 
bitcoins do not usually fall within the definition of securities. Only when 
virtual currency is created to facilitate a common speculative enterprise 
should they be determined to be securities. 
Consider why virtual currencies generally do not satisfy the three factors 
that would create SEC jurisdiction. First, while the court above did consider 
bitcoins to be currency, they are generally not considered so.142 Second, the 
Bitcoin network, or other networks, typically constitute peer-to-peer 
contracts between private parties in the settlement of some payment, and 
                                                                                                                 
 138. Id. (quoting Long, 881 F.2d at 141). 
 139. Author’s note: Even when strict vertical commonality is required, contracts in the 
nature of this case will satisfy the definition of a security. Looser commonality requirements 
in other jurisdictions may be satisfied with arrangements that organize investors in less 
dependent ways. 
 140. Shavers, 2013 WL 4028182. at *2-3. 
 141. Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56 (1990). 
 142. IRS Pub. Notice 2014-21 (2014), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-drop/n-14-
21.pdf. 
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form an exchange of limited duration which does not constitute a common 
enterprise unless the sale is explicitly (or in some cases implicitly by virtue 
of the promotor’s expertise) offered as part of one. Third, as this article 
argues, virtual currency has very little inherent value. The fact that 
speculators have latched onto virtual currency at this time as a commodity 
does not make it so; Magic: the Gathering cards are not securities simply 
because their price can fluctuate rapidly on the open market. Virtual 
currencies are not inherently speculative; only when their value is tied to 
some other concrete store of value, such as government currency or 
traditional commodities (in the case at issue, oil), will they be considered 
securities for jurisdictional purposes. 
3. What Changes Are Needed to Buttress Existing State and Federal 
Regulatory Subject Matter Jurisdiction to Allow Consumer Protection? 
As discussed, the Securities and Exchange Commission currently has the 
jurisdiction to investigate particularly egregious cases of speculative sale of 
virtual currency. The IRS already has the jurisdiction to investigate the 
gains and losses stemming from the ownership of virtual currency. And 
courts have already disposed of civil cases between aggrieved parties on 
virtual currency exchange networks. I would encourage lawmakers to limit 
what legislation they consider proposing at this early stage, and require only 
that newly created coins include encrypted information and disclosures. 
That would go a long way to alleviate consumer protection worries: All 
transferred virtual currency should include embedded messages should 
include consumer disclosures and addresses of recourse. 
A more radical proposal would be to require future virtual currencies to 
be backed by some store of value. New Virtual Coins could only be created 
by licensed money transmitters, and sold to the public as methods of 
transferring ownership of the value they represent. Coins could be 
prohibited from sale unless they contained information that could be used to 
draw upon funds, either in a bank account or from the issuing body itself. 
 Messages encrypted into Bitcoins are in a hexadecimal nonce, not 
plaintext embedded messages. They cannot be read unless the issuer and the 
reader have some agreed-upon encoding independent of the chain itself. 
With ASCII this is a trivial concern for those with the agreed-upon 
encoding, but if anyone else downloads a block the text will be illegible. 
How is this useful? All owners of the coin beyond the initial issuer 
would have access to an encoded file within their GodloveCoin that they 
could access but not read. This message would be a draw order (upon a 
bank account, for example, or entitling the owner to an ounce of gold). If 
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submitted to the bank, the bank would only be able to decode the file if the 
decryption algorithm had been shared by the issuer. Anyone submitting the 
order could be confirmed and the money could be withdrawn in real dollar 
after the bank receives possession of the Coin and decrypts the order. This 
would mean that the Coins have a terminal point: whenever an owner uses 
them to “cash out” at the bank where the issuer created the account joined 
to the Coin upon creation. Federal regulators should require this kind of 
system to be used in the creation of coins; and seize those on the open 
market that do not have these protections. This will proximately cause the 
stabilization and permit adequate regulation of virtual currency. 
D. When Should Regulators Enter? 
1. Every Transaction, or at the Beginning and End of the Chain? 
The central question is: What types of firms should be regulated; and 
which transactions should draw agency involvement? The two general 
answers are that regulators can either regulate each transfer of virtual 
currency between owners, or merely regulate the beginning and end of the 
chain. I believe that regulation can achieve all the desired functions by 
regulating only the beginning and end of the chain except for institutional 
owners, for reasons that follow below. 
Why should regulators not enter during each transmission? First, it is 
invasive. Police monitoring of each cash and debit transaction would be 
considered undue involvement in the lives of citizens, and may implicate 
federal Constitutional rights.  Second, such involvement would be 
expensive and burdensome, costing both government resources and stifling 
innovation. Third, such regulatory involvement would be practicably 
difficult to effectuate, more so than regulation of a single-point transaction 
network, due to the peer-to-peer qualities of virtual currency. 
Financial regulators would find it nearly impossible to provide oversight 
for every single individual, peer-to-peer transaction unless there is evidence 
of specific criminal or civil wrongdoing. Such instances would not need 
regulatory oversight, and could be dealt with in the current court tort 
system, or through specific causes of action to be discussed at a later date. 
Miners are a vital part of the ecosystem, but regulators have determined 
that they do not meet the threshold for proactive oversight. The US 
Treasury’s FinCEN issued a release stating this fact: Miners and individual 
investors do not merit oversight.143 This is the first broad stroke in laying 
down where regulation should begin, and is a positive step in keeping the 
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2014]        REGULATORY OVERVIEW OF VIRTUAL CURRENCY 45 
 
 
regulation to a minimum.144 We do not, for instance, require policing of 
every single individual transaction involving cash. But should we, as some 
suggest, only regulate transactions where virtual currencies are exchanged 
for dollars and other traditional currencies? 145 
Institutional investors, however, do merit increased oversight. Any 
organization the offers itself as a virtual currency exchange, or operates as 
one, or creates and offers a new virtual currency, should be required to 
register in their state, and every state in which their customers operate, as 
money transmission services. The laws governing money transmission 
services vary by state, but all require some minimum level of capital 
backing and consumer protections, as well as reporting requirements to 
limit money laundering and illicit purchasing. 
Without this minimum level of oversight virtual currency has a capacity 
to scale up money laundering in a way that is not possible with physical 
cash. Law enforcement is already aware of these issues and has expressed 
concern.146 The accelerating growth of virtual currencies in online and brick 
and mortar transactions and illicit networks can leave a gaping loophole for 
misconduct if this technology gains wider adoption. When it comes to using 
physical cash for illegal activity, criminals are constrained in certain 
respects to what they can physically carry and transport. There are no such 
limitations when it comes to virtual currencies. If we adopt an end-point 
terminal regulatory schema, and require institutions to monitor and report 
suspicious transactions internally, we will have to be assured that it 
reasonably limits money-laundering potential. 
2. Preventing Money Laundering at the Termination of Virtual Currency 
The United States Treasury Department recently enacted new rules to 
regulate Bitcoin and other virtual currencies, making it subject to the same 
level of scrutiny as other forms of currency. That’s bad news for anyone 
looking to launder money using Bitcoin, but it could be good news for 
proponents of virtual currency for legitimate purposes. Examples of 
regulated activities “include, in part, (1) the transfer of funds between a 
customer and a third party by permitting a third party to fund a customer’s 
                                                                                                                 
 144. Id. 
 145. NYDFS Virtual Currency Hearing, N.Y. DEP’T OF FIN. SERVS (Jan. 28, 2014), 
http://www.dfs.ny.gov/about/hearings/vc_01282014_indx.htm. 
 146. Money Transmitter Div., Cal. Dep’t of Fin. Insts., Developments and Issues in MSB 
Supervision (Aug. 25, 2011) (graphics presentation at a 2011 Conference of State Bank 
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account; (2) the transfer of value from a customer’s currency or commodity 
position to the account of another customer; or (3) the closing out of a 
customer’s currency or commodity position, with a transfer of proceeds to a 
third party. Since the definition of a money transmitter does not 
differentiate between real currencies and convertible virtual currencies, the 
same rules apply to brokers and dealers of e-currency and e-precious 
metals.147 Typically, this involves the broker or dealer electronically 
distributing digital certificates of ownership of real currencies or precious 
metals, with the digital certificate being the virtual currency. However, the 
same conclusions would apply in the case of the broker or dealer issuing 
paper ownership certificates or manifesting customer ownership or control 
of real currencies or commodities in an account statement or any other 
form. These conclusions would also apply in the case of a broker or dealer 
in commodities other than real currencies or precious metals. A broker or 
dealer of e-currencies or e-precious metals that engages in money 
transmission could be either an administrator or exchanger depending on its 
business model.148 
The Treasury rules treat Bitcoin and its ilk regulated in a similar fashion 
to how the government deals with traditional money-order services like 
Western Union.149 Individuals trading in Bitcoins need not concern 
themselves with reporting requirements, but businesses dealing with them, 
such as exchanges, will be required to keep more detailed records of the 
transactions. Transactions over $10,000 must be reported.150 A user of 
virtual currency is not an MSB under FinCEN’s regulations and therefore is 
not subject to MSB registration, reporting, and recordkeeping regulations. 
However, an administrator or exchanger is an MSB under FinCEN’s 
regulations, specifically, a money transmitter, unless a limitation to or 
exemption from the definition applies to the person.151 An administrator or 
                                                                                                                 
 147. Fin. Crimes Enforcement Network, Dep’t of the Treasury, Guidance: Application of 
the Definition of Money Transmitter to Brokers and Dealers in Currency and Other 
Commodities, FINCEN (No. FIN-2008-G008, Sept. 10, 2008), http://www.fincen.gov/ 
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Commission.”  Id. 
 148. Treasury Guidance FIN-2013-G001, supra note 3. 
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exchanger is not a provider or seller of prepaid access, or a dealer in foreign 
exchange, under FinCEN’s regulations.152 
Transfer of virtual currency into cash needs to be regulated, as well. 
Virtual currency purchases for consumer goods do not need to be 
investigated; it would be impractical for money launderers to purchase 
thousands of model train sets with dirty money. At the point in the chain 
where virtual currency is traded for readily-seized value, regulators need to 
be ready to enter. This end-of-chain transaction is where regulators should 
spend most of their time, and lawmakers should consider imposing strict 
requirements. This is the most important step of the chain because easy-to-
transfer-but-difficult-to-spend virtual currency is converted into difficult-to-
transfer-but-easy-to-spend gold or cash. 
As a bare minimum, legislators should require that virtual currency 
cannot be converted into cash or gold except at banks or other licensed 
financial institutions. A more strict regulation (which I endorse) would 
prevent Bitcoins from being converted to cash or gold entirely, unless they 
are transferred to their creator’s bank. In such regime, all virtual currency 
would need to be created in connection with an originating bank, and 
embedded text in the Coins would tell owners at which bank the Coin may 
be “cashed out;” owners who wish to convert their Coins would transfer 
ownership to the bank, after which the bank would verify the Coin and 
release the funds to the owner. Banks would be required to report 
suspicious transactions, as detailed below. 
3. Taxation 
Bitcoins also pose regulatory difficulty to the income tax code. How 
should they be taxed? Again, a regulatory schema that limits itself to the 
start and end points of coins would be superior, as it would fit seamlessly 
into the federal tax regime. "Bitcoin is not a currency," despite the 
protestations of some supporters, and “[u]sers of Bitcoin should not think 
that it is exempt from taxation or outside the tax system. There's nothing 
that Bitcoin allows anyone to do that they can't already do in the regular 
banking system ... Libertarians, drug dealers, and tinfoil hatters like Bitcoin 
because it is not issued by a central government, but the irony is that it is 
more controllable and more traceable than the U.S. bank notes . . . .”153 
The only true cases on point comes from Barter Systems, a company that 
allowed customers to trade in hard assets in return for "trade units" issued 
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by the firm. The U.S. tax court ruled that Barter Systems was required to 
report transactions involving these trade units and that the exchange should 
be taxed on the fair market value of property received in exchange for trade 
units.154 According to Tax Attorney Lee Sheppard, “Bitcoin is analogous to 
the trade units considered in Barter Systems Inc. of Wichita. It is a privately 
issued medium of exchange accepted only in constrained circumstances and 
not backed by any promise of the issuer. Colvin treated the trade units as 
property in analyzing their use. The same analysis applies to Bitcoin.”155 
And indeed the IRS later confirmed that for federal tax purposes, virtual 
currency is treated as property. 
General tax principles applicable to property transactions apply to 
transactions using virtual currency. The basis of virtual currency that a 
taxpayer receives as payment for goods or services is the fair market value 
of the virtual currency in U.S. dollars as of the date of receipt.156 One who 
purchases ten BTC for $100 will receive ten bitcoins each with a $10 basis. 
For sale of virtual currency for U.S. tax purposes, transactions must be 
reported in U.S. dollars. Therefore, taxpayers will be required to determine 
the fair market value of virtual currency in U.S. dollars as of the date of 
payment or receipt. If a virtual currency is listed on an exchange and the 
exchange rate is established by market supply and demand, the fair market 
value of the virtual currency is determined by converting the virtual 
currency into U.S. dollars (or into another real currency which in turn can 
be converted into U.S. dollars) at the exchange rate, in a reasonable manner 
that is consistently applied.  
If the fair market value of property received in exchange for virtual 
currency exceeds the taxpayer’s adjusted basis of the virtual currency, the 
taxpayer has taxable gain. The taxpayer has a loss if the fair market value of 
the property received is less than the adjusted basis of the virtual currency. 
The character of the gain or loss generally depends on whether the 
virtual currency is a capital asset in the hands of the taxpayer. A taxpayer 
generally realizes capital gain or loss on the sale or exchange of virtual 
currency that is a capital asset in the hands of the taxpayer. For example, 
stocks, bonds, and other investment property are generally capital assets. A 
taxpayer generally realizes ordinary gain or loss on the sale or exchange of 
virtual currency that is not a capital asset in the hands of the taxpayer. 
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Inventory and other property held mainly for sale to customers in a trade or 
business are examples of property that is not a capital asset.157 
A payment made using virtual currency is subject to information 
reporting to the same extent as any other payment made in property. For 
example, a person who in the course of a trade or business makes a 
payment of fixed and determinable income using virtual currency with a 
value of $600 or more to a U.S. non-exempt recipient in a taxable year is 
required to report the payment to the IRS and to the payee.158 Examples of 
payments of fixed and determinable income include rent, salaries, wages, 
premiums, annuities, and compensation.  
Generally, a person who in the course of a trade or business makes a 
payment of $600 or more in a taxable year to an independent contractor for 
the performance of services is required to report that payment to the IRS 
and to the payee on Form 1099-MISC, Miscellaneous Income.159 Payments 
of virtual currency required to be reported on Form 1099-MISC should be 
reported using the fair market value of the virtual currency in U.S. dollars 
as of the date of payment. 
Generally, a person who in the course of a trade or business makes a 
payment of $600 or more in a taxable year to an independent contractor for 
the performance of services is required to report that payment to the IRS 
and to the payee on Form 1099-MISC, Miscellaneous Income. Payments of 
virtual currency required to be reported on Form 1099-MISC should be 
reported using the fair market value of the virtual currency in U.S. dollars 
as of the date of payment. The payment recipient may have income even if 
the recipient does not receive a Form 1099-MISC. See the Instructions to 
Form 1099-MISC and the General Instructions for Certain Information 
Returns for more information. For payments to non-U.S. persons, see 
Publication 515, Withholding of Tax on Nonresident Aliens and Foreign 
Entities. 
These IRS regulations are not surprising considering that for tax 
purposes, gross income is defined as “income from whatever source 
derived.”160 Barter of goods and services count as taxable income so a 
virtual currency should also be considered as such, and not a currency 
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(considering the fluctuations in price inherent in the virtual currency 
network). 
The IRS ruling does, however, pose problems for Bitcoin miners. Those 
who mined hundreds of Coins when the value of bitcoins was $300 and 
sold them when the exchanges were valuing BTC at over $1,000 have 
realized taxable gain of several hundred dollars per Coin.161 Those who 
mined bitcoins when the fair market value for each Coin exceeded $1,000 
and fell to less than $500 have a good amount of capital losses they may 
claim. It may behoove the IRS to consider further limitations to capital 
gains and losses on virtual currency, lest a future article detail methods by 
which unscrupulous traders may generate large paper losses with virtual 
currency in order to deduct from their taxes. 
E. How Future Regulations Will Begin to Work in Practice 
1. Which Laws Need to Be enacted at the Minimum 
Ideally, all virtual currency, such as Bitcoin and its derivative variants, 
will be required to include plaintext consumer disclosures in plaintext as 
riders attached to each file. Furthermore, any new derivative coin created 
from now on must include encrypted messages in each Coin in the Genesis 
block with a withdrawal order at a specific bank where the creator operates 
an account. The private key unlocking the message would be shared with 
the bank by the creator, and any subsequent owner of the Coin would thus 
be enabled to transfer ownership of the Coin to the bank and receive cash 
transferred from the account. If I wanted to create a new Coin and call it 
GodloveCoins, I would need to be a licensed money transmitter162 with a 
bank account containing sufficient funds, communicate my private key to 
the bank, and let the account wait in trust for ownership of the 
GodloveCoin. Creating and owning the GodloveCoin Genesis block, I 
could now transmit ownership to the bank from anywhere in the world and 
receive access to the proportionate funds. Or, if I transferred them to a new 
owner, that owner and any subsequent owner down the block chain, could 
“cash in” the GodloveCoin with my bank. 
An obvious point about GodloveCoin concept is that it limits the amount 
of new regulatory structure government needed to prevent virtual money 
                                                                                                                 
 161. However, the IRS has permitted those in extraordinary circumstances to explain 
their reason for failing to pay taxes on their Bitcoin gains in 2013/2014. 
 162. Because “a person that creates units of convertible virtual currency and sells those 
units to another person for real currency or its equivalent is engaged in transmission to 
another location and is a money transmitter,” creators of virtual currency must be registered 
as money transmitters. 
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laundering and protect consumers of virtual currency. The least possible 
change to existing framework needs to be done, which should make privacy 
advocates, limited government advocates, and ‘Net libertarians happy.  
Resolution of disputes between parties has been discussed above. 
Government notification in the GodloveCoin scheme happens only in the 
case of irregular banking withdrawals of cash or suspicious transfers at 
online currency exchanges. GodloveCoins could theoretically be traded 
across the entire globe time and time again without triggering any flags if 
they are traded legitimately. In such a case, the public ledger would be 
saved and recorded by law enforcement but not used to track transactions or 
decrypted to identify owners. Users would act in a relatively unrestricted 
environment, using petty amounts of GodloveCoin as cash, changing hands 
and transferring the options to draw upon the cash in the account, or sell 
ownership of the Coin itself. It is also probable that banks would become 
the primary organizations conducting the ‘mining’ required to resolve 
transfers, which will keep their transfers safe and secure the network 
against concentrated malicious hackers.163  Banking regulatory schemes 
would come into play only when the coins were drawn upon. In such a case, 
the Coins would be turned into real cash. At this point, standard banking 
regulations trigger. Transmissions would only be regulated in the creation 
and centralized exchanging of virtual currency. 
2. The GodloveCoin in the Proposed Regulatory Scheme 
Let’s take a hypothetical example.  The Godlove Corporation in 
California, USA wants to buy a thousand widgets from Manufacturing Ltd. 
in New York. Manufacturing Ltd. buys its raw material from Oil Inc. in 
Oman. And Oil Inc. has a banking account in New York State. Godlove 
Corp. creates a million GodloveCoins for the purchase of the widgets. 
Godlove Corp. has accounts in a California bank with some established 
minimum amount, in this case $1M. The created Coins are all tied to the 
account, and each GodloveCoin contains encrypted code entitling the owner 
to draw of one dollar from the account. The private keys used to encode the 
message are transmitted to the bank. The GodloveCoins are all transferred 
to Manufacturing Corp. Manufacturing Corp., intending to buy some raw 
materials to begin the order, “cashes in” half the coins by transferring 
ownership to the bank. The hash numbers are sent to the bank, where they 
are decrypted into valid draw orders with the secret key. Manufacturing 
Corp. withdraws half a million dollars from the local bank and has them 
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transferred to their bank. The other half of the GodloveCoins are transferred 
to Oil Inc. in Oman in order to buy raw materials. Oil Inc. receives the new 
hash numbers, which are verified on the public block chain, and 
immediately transfers the Coins to its subsidiary corporation in California. 
In California, the GodloveCoins are resolved as above and the funds are 
withdrawn. Now that all of the Coins have been transferred to the bank, and 
the account is empty, the bank’s fiduciary duty to preserve the private key 
and manage a private wallet for the Coins ends and the data can be 
destroyed. The ability to draw in New York on a purchase made in 
California is old news, but here has been done in a more efficient, quicker, 
and less costly fashion. Godlove Corps.’ bank in California will make a 
payment to Oil’s bank in Oman, perhaps with an EFT. If there are any 
suspicious indicia, they will be revealed to the bank now and reported to the 
proper authorities. The GodloveCoin, created for a particular purchasing 
arrangement, is now worthless and trading among further parties, whether 
authorized or not, will be pointless. Any future transfers will be rejected, as 
the checksum will not validate. 
The advantages are numerous: no money has been lost to currency 
exchange: The half-million dollars drawn from New York have the same 
value as the half-million sent from California. Additionally, the records of 
exchange are public and the identities of the transferees, if known to the 
participants, can be easily traced and deduced, but would be much more 
difficult for outsiders to link or determine the identities of the participants. 
From the standpoint of the federal government, such transfers are 
acceptable because money laundering and banking notification 
requirements are triggered.  
Suspicious Activity Reports (SARs) have become the primary source of 
information from financial institutions and other reporting sources (casinos, 
currency exchanges, etc.) to assist in anti-money laundering efforts. SARs 
increased from 52,000 in 1996 to 288,000 in 2003.164 Nearly half of these 
were characterized as “violations of the Bank Secrecy Act (BSA) / 
Structuring / Money Laundering.”165 Law enforcement officials consider 
SARs more useful and informative in the identification of suspicious 
activity than many other sources. Additionally, there are examples of 
money laundering being discovered by small banks that failed to file SARs. 
Great Eastern Bank of Florida, with deposits of $55 million failed to alert 
                                                                                                                 
 164. PETER REUTER & EDWIN M. TRUMAN, INST. FOR INT’L ECON., CHASING DIRTY 
MONEY: THE FIGHT AGAINST MONEY LAUNDERING 108 (2004). 
 165. Id. 
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authorities of the structured deposits of some customers. FinCEN 
investigated and determined willful violations based on the lack of 
reporting or vague details when SARs were filed.166 Virtual Currency 
exchanges, and banks that “cash in” virtual currency will be under reporting 
requirements, which will include reporting of customers who appear to be 
involved in money laundering or structuring. 
If the block transfer looks suspicious, investigators will have the option 
of requesting further information and looking at the investigation. The 
origin of the Coins will be obvious and regulators will be able to request 
information from the creator of the coins. Regulators will also be able to see 
the record of transfers and, while the identities of the block-chain recipients 
will be anonymous (initially), any suspicious transfers will become 
immediately apparent. Thus, the ability to determine if money laundering, 
tax evasion, or purchase of illicit goods will be inherent in the system, with 
reporting requirements similar to the current financial scheme, while 
permitting innovation, freedom, and limiting of costs that offer so much 
promise in the emerging realm of virtual currency. 
3. How Proposed Virtual Currency Would Assist International 
Purchases 
What about governments that restrict virtual currency to cash 
transactions? China, for example, has chosen to limit the use of Bitcoins to 
Yuan exchanges. It was really no surprise given China’s stringent capital 
controls.167 But the move was interesting in the context of China’s recent 
history. QQ Messenger, the most popular messaging application in China 
with currently 800 million users, at one time embedded its own virtual 
currency (“QQ coin”). In 2009, the PBOC issued guidance that said it was 
illegal to trade QQ coin for fear that it was being used for illicit purposes. 
Conversely, the PBOC issued guidance that Bitcoin may be traded by 
private persons, but traditional financial institutions and third-party 
payment processors may not deal with virtual currency. 
China maintains a tight control of the Yuan, and officials recognize that 
virtual currencies may be used as arbitrage tools against the currency. It is 
                                                                                                                 
 166. Assessment of Civil Money Penalty, In re Great E. Bank of Fla., No. 2002-02 (Fin. 
Crimes Enforcement Network, Dep’t of the Treasury Sept. 4, 2002), available at http:// 
www.fincen.gov/news_room/ea/files/geassessfinal.pdf 
 167. To see an example of the intellectual contortions that such stringent regimes 
engender, such as an argument that virtual currency is distinct from virtual coinage, see Sun 
Guang-zhi, Study on Virtual Currency, 11 TECHNOLOGICAL DEV. ENTERPRISE 30 (2006) 
(published in Beijing, China). 
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unlikely that virtual currency will ever been permitted to exchange into 
Yuan, unless Chinese international policy dramatically shifts. However, 
there is no reason that U.S.-bank-backed virtual currencies may not be used 
by individuals in China before transfer back to U.S. firms. Such currencies 
could in fact find several favorable niches in the Chinese market. 
4. How Proposed Virtual Currency Would Prevent Theft 
Let us imagine, then, a scenario similar to the hypothetical example 
above, except that this time an international firm steals the GodloveCoins. 
A criminal syndicate in Russia that seeks to use the virtual currency to 
launder money now owns half of the Coins. The first problem the syndicate 
faces is that the coins are tied to known bank accounts in America. Once 
the theft is reported, the accounts can be closed or watched for draw orders. 
Payment between Manufacturing Ltd. and Oil Inc. has not been completed, 
and the parties, aware that the account is now frozen to Coin withdrawals, 
may arrange alternative payment (an EFT, for example). Even if the 
criminal syndicate attempts to use the Coins to draw upon the accounts 
before the parties have been alerted to the theft, an inspection of the public 
ledger by the bank should indicate the unusual provenance of the Coins. 
This will, of course, trigger banking reporting requirements. Large transfers 
between accounts will be tracked, as in the normal course of business. 
Attempts to withdraw money may signal to law enforcement that they 
should investigate, whereupon it is a trivial matter to backtrack the public 
chain of transfers from the bank account to the initial release. Again, this is 
public information which makes it much quicker and easier to access for 
law enforcement than traditional bank records across the globe, and 
methods of decrypting the anonymity will make indexing such transfers 
fairly trivial.  
The only downside to this proposed regime would be in the use of grey-
market virtual currency: Currency tied to secret bank accounts in countries 
with above-average banking privacy laws; or coins created to foil attempts 
to decrypt the identities of transferors such as those that are automatically 
routed through botnets. The trade-off of such proposed grey-market 
currency would be a decreased trust by the parties using them. Such 
denominations would necessarily be small, and their fair market value, 
would either be substantially lower than the amount to be called upon from 
the bank account, limiting the competitive advantage from such coins 
compared to traditional forms of money laundering; or, if decoupled from 
the actual accounts, meaning the entire value of the currency would be 
retained in the form of speculative investment, and for such currency, the 
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only value that could be extracted from such Coins would be in the form of 
illicit goods, such as laundered petty cash, drugs, etc.  
V.  What Needs to Be Addressed 
Clearly, the future of virtual currency is exciting and difficult to predict. 
But by determining probable future developments, and gently prodding the 
developers of these products toward development in the areas outlined 
above, I predict a stable and useful product may result. Such currency 
would enjoy significant cost and time-savings over current methods of 
purchase and payment over the internet, which is a vitally needed 
development in the increasingly globalized world. And, given the outlines 
above, government regulation would not stifle such development.168 In fact, 
certain enjoyable legal protections would be extended to virtual currency, 
offering the kind of legitimate backing and protections that can lead to 
widespread adoption by the general community. Here are specific proposals 
for applying existing rules for money transmitters or banks, which have 
generally served consumers well when vigorously enforced. Indeed, certain 
aspects of virtual currency could dovetail with existing regulations. That 
said, our agency will likely have to proceed with issuing some form of 
specially tailored BitLicense that adapts those rules to the world of virtual 
currency.  
A. Consumer Education, Protection, and Disclosures 
1. The Need for Disclosures 
Consumers should be aware that many virtual currencies do not provide 
for chargebacks. Disclosures encoded in the plaintext of virtual currency, or 
the website operated by the creator, should clearly tell consumers that 
transactions are, for the most part, irreversible. In other words, there is 
generally no “money back guarantees” for crypto-currencies.169 Such 
guarantees would need to come from reputable businesses in jurisdictions 
where traditional consumer lawsuits are routine in order for consumers to 
feel secure relying them. 
Consumers should also be warned about the importance of keeping their 
“private keys” private – as well as the potential consequences if they fail to 
                                                                                                                 
 168. Brian W. Smith & Ramsey J. Wilson, How Best to Guide the Evolution of 
Electronic Currency Law; 46 AM. U. L. REV. 1105 (1996-1997). 
 169. But see Ethan E. White, Massively Multiplayer Online Fraud: Why the Introduction 
of Real World Law in a Virtual Context Is Good for Everyone; 6 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. 
PROP. 228 (2007-2008). 
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do so. Given the irreversibility of most transactions, if a consumer has their 
private key stolen, they could easily lose their virtual currency irretrievably. 
The legal notice issued by Flexcoin should be examined as an inadequate 
disclosure, which should fall under the legal minimum for future 
standards.170 
Moreover, consumers should be informed about the documented 
volatility of virtual currency and the potential for loss of dollar-
denominated principal if they hold onto that virtual currency for an 
extended period of time. Because virtual currencies can be so easily traded, 
creators should be aware that their products will rarely be limited to 
sophisticated investors.  Like mutual funds or retirement plans, the 
obligation rests on the seller to ensure that consumers understand the nature 
of these financial instruments. 
If the United States intends to promote itself as the central location in 
which virtual currency can be bought, sold, and invested upon, it must first 
ensure that average consumers are provided with strong, clear, concise 
disclosures, just as it has in the securities and banking realms. 
How should these disclosures be made? Unlike Paypal or credit card 
providers (where a central authority controls the payments and acts as the 
intermediary between parties), there is by definition no intermediary in 
virtual currency. Users do not need to sign a contract with their terms and 
conditions, including disclosures, in order to receive coins. And, in the 
wake of increasingly flourishing variants of the Bitcoin as alternative 
virtual currency, there is no single easily recognized authority from which 
disclosures could be made. 
2. Virtual Currency Disclosures 
The largest burden to make initial disclosures to consumers should be on 
the initial creator of the virtual currency. In the initial public offering (even 
if the entirety of the currency is immediately transferred to a single source), 
the currency will need to be bundled with a short plaintext disclosure 
directing any owner to a website containing the public disclosures. This 
page would need to be maintained by the creator of the Coin for the 
duration of the Coin’s life, until such time as the accounts are tapped and 
the Coins expire. This will lead to a form of continuing liability for the 
                                                                                                                 
 170. “Legal Notice: We are not a true bank that accepts USD or any national currency, 
only bitcoins which by their nature are not regulated, we’re not FDIC insured or regulated by 
any government entity.” Note that Flexcoin closed its doors after reporting the loss of 
millions of dollars from its online virtual currency wallets. 
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creator of Coins, and would lessen the incentive to create coins for any but 
large institutions. 
A second way disclosures could be made would to bundle the plaintext 
disclosures with each Coin; a checksum would make altering the plaintext 
difficult, as the Coins would not authenticate on transfer if the public 
disclosures have been altered. The downsides are technical: This would 
increase the size of each transfer, and would potentially make the 
encryption of the cyphertext less secure. It would also make it impossible to 
change the public disclosure for the life of the Coin; neither the owner nor 
the initial creator could alter these disclosures without rendering the Coin 
unable to transfer (as, being altered, the Coins would not authenticate on 
transfer). 
Other places public disclosures could be made are in the transfers 
themselves. This would have the advantage of limiting liability for the 
creator of the Coin to the initial transfer only without leaving a trail of 
continuing liability and necessity to monitor and update disclosures of 
created Coins. Disclosures could be done automatically, if regulators 
required any front-end software to make such warnings during 
transmission. This would be a ‘click-through’ contract of the type that 
consumers never read while updating iTunes or installing Photoshop. Most 
of the home-brewed Bitcoin software is currently woefully programmed 
and would not meet standards of consumer safety if sold retail. It would be 
the place of some “killer-app” or possibly website that would corner the 
market on exchanges and included click-through disclosures on transfer to 
make such a form of consumer protection viable. It is possible that 
regulatory structure could require new exchange software to include certain 
mandated disclosures that end-users would see upon installation or use of 
the software.  
The last potential form of consumer disclosure would be on an ad-hoc 
basis between parties of a transfer. If Coins were limited mainly to large 
institutional users (as anticipated in the GodloveCoin hypotheticals), the 
parties could be relied upon to negotiate disclosures and apportionment of 
liabilities between themselves without regulation. Such disclosures would 
rapidly converge on commonly used boilerplate, and variations of these 
contracts could become commonly copied for use among less sophisticated 
consumers or investors. If large institutions do begin to adopt virtual 
currency, regulatory agencies would be well-served by adopting a wait-and-
see attitude to allow private parties to experiment and determine where 
apportionment of liability should lie, and what disclosures are offered or 
sought. 
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Until more development occurs, it would be premature to seek to name 
the kinds of disclosures consumers would need in the use of virtual 
currency. General outlines can be named, but the devil’s in the details. At 
the very least, standard disclosures made by more traditional e-payment 
methods that could not be made for virtual currency can be listed here, and 
their implications laid out. First, the avoidance of ACH or other clearing 
houses during payment mean consumers cannot count on suspicious 
transfers being caught before they are made. Consumers’ coins that are 
available online are insecure, and this dovetails into the second major 
disclosure that consumers cannot be expected to find: there are no 
chargebacks, no refunds, and no returns possible for stolen digital 
currencies. Consumers need to be aware that their currency is as 
untraceable as cash and as insecure as their email. This is the price of 
pseudo-anonymous, easily transferable block-cypher virtual currency. This 
is an inextricable fact of the currency; and attempts to provide consumer 
protection would eliminate many of the aspects of virtual currency that 
make it desirable in the first place. 
Just as credit card companies protects their customers from fraud and 
assume the risk for fraudulent use of credit card accounts, there could be 
large institutions that assume the liability for use of Coins. Such companies 
would keep the Coins in their own accounts and credit consumers with 
Coins but keep them and make largely paper trades, except to trusted 
outsiders. These virtual currency exchanges would (as discussed above) be 
required to register as money transmitters and held by the Treasury to anti-
money laundering requirements, but would assume the additional 
responsibilities of ensuring that purchases made from certain trusted 
sources included agreed-upon consumer protections. Users of the Coins 
who made purchases from trusted sites and used Coins held for them by an 
exchange could enjoy the same guarantees and return policies as consumers 
in large retail stores. 
B. Protection from Theft, Prevention of Illicit Purchase 
1. Can Consumers Waive Liability Against Unauthorized Transfer? 
One of the biggest questions with virtual currency exchanges is whether 
they will insure against unauthorized transfers. An "Unauthorized 
Transaction" is a type of error that occurs when money is sent from the 
customer’s account that they did not authorize and that they do not benefit 
from. An obvious example of unauthorized transaction would be a hacker 
who steals a customer’s password, and uses the password to access and 
initial a virtual currency transfer, possibly from a currency exchange site. 
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However, it is standard policy that anyone entrusted with password access 
to a Coin by that Coin’s owner may use that Coin as an agent of the owner, 
and that a currency exchange would not consider transfers made to be 
unauthorized, even if they did not benefit the owner.171 
2. Currency Exchange Protections Against Unauthorized Transfer 
PayPal, the most successful online money transmission service, protects 
its users against "Other Errors" that occur when money is either incorrectly 
taken from customer accounts and when transactions are incorrectly 
recorded in their accounts. PayPal protects customers when: sent payments 
are incorrectly debited from their account; an incorrect amount is credited 
to a customer’s account; if a transaction is missing from or not properly 
identified in the account statement; the customer receives an incorrect 
amount of money at an ATM; and if there is a computational or 
mathematical error by PayPal. PayPal further provides that its customers 
authorize PayPal to handle all disputes, claims, chargebacks, and reversals 
as set forth in the User Agreement. Because PayPal is a centralized money 
transmission service, such an agreement makes sense for it.  
The unauthorized transaction protection is most likely to be the point on 
which consumers and exchanges differ. Bitcoins are unlike other methods 
of payment in their ability to be rapidly transferred and difficult to trace, 
which makes chargebacks impossible. Thus, stolen Bitcoins (any 
transferred without owner or trustee authorization) are gone. Who should 
risk this loss? Bitcoins have been stolen through two major security 
breaches thus far: poor security in the front-end and poor password 
protection by the owners. When Bitcoins are kept in trust on an exchange 
and stolen because of lax or poor site security, the exchange should clearly 
be liable for the loss. And for Bitcoins held locally on owner’s computers 
and stolen because of poor password protection or one of several methods 
of unauthorized entry on the computer and transfer, the owner who left the 
security hole on their own computers should bear the risk (they left the door 
‘unlocked’ and are responsible for their own theft. But what about Bitcoins 
left in trust on an exchange that are lost due to the owner’s poor choice in 
password, or by publicly revealing their password? In such cases, the 
exchange should still be held liable by default, unless the users of the 
exchange have agreed previously to accept responsibility for the loss or 
theft of their Coins due to poor password protocol. This is likely to become 
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a standard term of use for future exchanges, and will shift the burden of 
liability to the person most “responsible” for the security hole that allowed 
the unauthorized transfer. This is another reason to disallow exchanges that 
do not have significant reserves, like registered money transmitters. 
3. Arbitration Clauses 
It seems likely to me that future Coins will include arbitration clauses in 
their plaintext. Arbitration by the acceptance of a ticket is permitted,172 so 
acceptance of a Coin likely includes agreement to the arbitration clauses 
contained therein. This could be used to save money or be used against the 
consumers in disputes. 
The Federal Arbitration Act requires that federal substantive law applies 
when the arbitration agreement is connected to a transaction involving 
interstate commerce.173 Whether the arbitration agreement is connected to a 
transaction involving interstate commerce is a factual determination in each 
case.174 Under the FAA, on the motion of a party, a court must stay 
proceedings and order the parties to arbitrate the dispute if the court finds 
that the parties have agreed in writing to do so.175 A party seeking to 
compel arbitration must show (1) that a valid agreement to arbitrate exists 
between the parties and (2) that the specific dispute falls within the scope of 
the agreement.176 
Arbitration clauses may be avoided if their application would be 
unconscionable. Under California law, unconscionability has both 
procedural and substantive components.177 The procedural component can 
be satisfied by showing (1) oppression through the existence of unequal 
bargaining positions or (2) surprise through hidden terms common in the 
context of adhesion contracts.178 The substantive component can be 
                                                                                                                 
 172. Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585 ( 1991). 
 173. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Coviello, 233 F.3d 710, 713 n.1 (3d Cir. 2000); 
Marciano v. MONY Life Ins. Co., 470 F. Supp. 2d 518, 524 (E.D. Pa. 2007) (Robreno, J.); 
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PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3569, at 173 (2d ed. 1984) ("[I]n a diversity suit . . . , the 
substantive rules contained in the [Federal Arbitration] Act, based as it is on the commerce 
and admiralty powers, are to be applied regardless of state law."). 
 174. State Farm, 233 F.3d at 713 n.1. 
 175. 9 U.S.C. §§ 3, 4, 6. (2012). 
 176. Trippe Mfg. Co. v. Niles Audio Corp., 401 F.3d 529, 532 (3d Cir. 2005); 
PaineWebber, Inc. v. Hartmann, 921 F.2d 507, 511 (3d Cir. 1990). 
 177. Davis v. O'Melveny & Myers, 485 F.3d 1066, 1072-73 (9th Cir. 2007); Comb v. 
PayPal, Inc., 218 F. Supp. 2d 1165, 1172 (N.D. Cal. 2002). 
 178. Comb, 218 F. Supp. 2d at 1172. 
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satisfied by showing overly harsh or one-sided results that "shock the 
conscience."179 The two elements operate on a sliding scale such that the 
more significant one is, the less significant the other need be.180 However, a 
claim of unconscionability cannot be determined merely by examining the 
face of the contract; there must be an inquiry into the circumstances under 
which the contract was executed, and the contract's purpose, and effect.181  
Typical cryptocurrency arbitration clauses, if they become popular, will 
fall under the guidance of Comb v. PayPal.182 Arbitration clauses will only 
be binding if included in the original Genesis block of the Coin. Those who 
attempt to attach arbitration clauses to their Coins on resale, after their 
initial creation, will be changing the terms of the agreement upon which the 
Coins were created, and courts will be correct to reject such arbitration 
clauses.183 Even if such clauses are included at the creation of the virtual 
currency, they will be unconscionable adhesion contracts (and thus 
correctly rejected by courts) unless the party seeking arbitration shows that 
the purchaser was a sophisticated user in a competitive market for their 
Coins.184 
However, even if instant agreement is procedurally unconscionable, it 
may nonetheless be enforceable if the substantive terms are reasonable.185 
For instance, adhesion contracts on Coins should be mutual, which means 
neither the buyer and seller should enjoy an unfair advantage in the choice 
of arbitration over the other.186 Arbitration clauses should specify the fees 
and relative position of the parties in arbitration so that an unknown and 
unidentified risk of excessive fees will not be sufficient to defeat a valid 
arbitration clause.187 
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4. Illicit Purchase 
What about the use of Coins in illicit purchases? We should look at the 
ways that current Internet money transmitters restrict users’ ability to 
purchase illicit goods. The PayPal user terms of service prohibits activities 
that:  
(1) violate any law, statute, ordinance or regulation, (2) relate to 
transactions involving (a) narcotics, steroids, certain controlled 
substances or other products that present a risk to consumer 
safety, (b) drug paraphernalia, (c) items that encourage, promote, 
facilitate or instruct others to engage in illegal activity, (d) stolen 
goods including digital and virtual goods (e) items that promote 
hate, violence, racial intolerance, or the financial exploitation of 
a crime, (f) items that are considered obscene, (g) items that 
infringe or violate any copyright, trademark, right of publicity or 
privacy or any other proprietary right under the laws of any 
jurisdiction, (h) certain sexually oriented materials or services, 
(i) ammunition, firearms, or certain firearm parts or accessories, 
or (j) ,certain weapons or knives regulated under applicable law, 
(3) relate to transactions that (a) show the personal information 
of third parties in violation of applicable law, (b) support 
pyramid or Ponzi schemes, matrix programs, other "get rich 
quick" schemes or certain multi-level marketing programs, . . . 
(d) are for the sale of certain items before the seller has control 
or possession of the item, (e) are by payment processors to 
collect payments on behalf of merchants, (f), . . . (4) involve the 
sales of products or services identified by government agencies 
to have a high likelihood of being fraudulent. violate applicable 
laws or industry regulations regarding the sale of (a) tobacco 
products, or (b) prescription drugs and devices.188 
Paypal also prevents its use in connection with gambling or lottery sales, 
although the use of virtual currency in gambling should be restricted 
already though preexisting federal and state laws.189 
These restrictions are important but largely unenforceable in virtual 
currency. The difference is that, for virtual currency, there is no central 
clearing house that could easily identify and prevent the transmission of 
                                                                                                                 
 188. PayPal Acceptable Use Policy, PAYPAL, https://cms.paypal.com/c2/cgi-bin/?cmd=_ 
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 189. 18 U.S.C. § 1301 (2012).  
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money to illegal goods. Again, the burden would for the most part lies with 
the escrow houses; but in peer-to-peer transmission, all escrow is bypassed. 
The only realistic burden is the increased risk of theft or fraud, for which 
the consumer who bypassed the safety of an escrow house would have no 
recourse. Additionally, such restrictions would be overly burdensome on 
the use of virtual currency, and such stipulations as restricting payment 
before the possession has control or possession of the item being sold 
would severely restrict their functionality. 
It would be far better for such restrictions to be determined by the 
creators of virtual currency and embedded in the public disclosures. It 
would then fall to the owner’s responsibility to check the terms of service 
and use the virtual currency only as the terms provide. Such restrictions 
would be largely unenforceable but consumer protections and law 
enforcement could be better served by focusing on other methods. 
C. Safety and Soundness Requirements 
1. Should Exchanges Hold Reserves and How 
The capital, collateral, net worth, and investment requirements of virtual 
currency are currently under debate. Who should retain sufficient capital 
and collateral to secure end users against loss and theft? The Bitcoin 
exchanges that currently exist have no capital reserves, and simply deduct 
losses from theft, fraud, and embezzlement from their users’ accounts. Such 
practices are damaging to consumer confidence and likely criminal. But 
should these exchanges, acting like money transmission services, be bound 
to reimburse users for their losses? How? Should end-users or issuers be 
required to maintain collateral or capital reserves upon which their virtual 
currency can be drawn? 
Traditional money transmitters and banks have to abide by certain net 
worth and permissible investment requirements to help ensure that they are 
operating in a safe and sound manner. They, for example, need to have a 
large enough capital buffers on their balance sheets to absorb unexpected 
losses and financial shocks without going under. They are also limited in 
the types of investments they can hold – so they are not taking reckless 
risks with customer money in the search of windfall profits. 
Virtual currency exchange firms should be required to abide by similar 
requirements. However, regulators need to restructure the rules in light of 
the fact that the virtual currencies these firms hold are not denominated in 
dollars or other forms of traditional currency. Coins held in trust, if lost, 
must be replaced by Coins held by the firm, not taken from the consumers’ 
accounts. This much is obvious. But what if replacement Coins cannot be 
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found, or the theft bankrupts the company? What monetary replacements 
should be made, and how should the values be determined? If Coins are 
legally barred from being exchanged for cash, how will consumers be 
compensated for their losses? The issue is further complicated by the fact 
that the value of virtual currencies relative to traditional currencies can 
fluctuate significantly on a day-by-day or even hour-by-hour basis. The 
simple answer is that GodloveCoins, or any coins that are based upon a 
stable unit of value such as gold or corporate stock, will make such 
valuations trivially easy. Buyers and regulators will find themselves 
laboring to calculate the value of virtual currency that “floats”. This is a 
strong reason that regulators should require virtual currency to be 
established upon some base value. If an exchange loses those Coins, the 
value can be easily calculated by determining the value of the base reserve 
that the Coins were created with at the time of the loss. Reserve capital 
requirements for exchanges can be easily calculated by state law: If virtual 
currency can easily be exchanged for cash by the exchange firm, it needs 
only to keep enough Coins in its own possession to satisfy existing state 
money transmission laws. These Coins must be held in offline wallets, safe 
from theft and “runs” by customers. End users who lose virtual currency 
held on their own would still be at a loss, however, but this will simply 
encourage them to save their virtual currency in secure exchanges. 
Net worth, capital, and permissible investment requirements are among 
the most important consumer protection requirements we can put in place 
as regulators. Exchanges and other virtual currency firms that have frozen 
redemptions for extended periods of time damage to consumer confidence. 
The long-term strength of the virtual currency industry will require robust 
safety and soundness requirements – so customers have faith that their 
money won’t get caught in a virtual black hole. These requirements can be 
met when exchanges are required to register as money transmission 
services, and undergo such safety and soundness requirements that this 
entails. The Silicon Valley company is handling this by becoming 
registered in each state as a certified money transmitter, which includes 
minimum amounts to be held. This new model of virtual business will need 
to be well-funded and will likely be regarded with suspicion by established 
banks for some time. This will lead to private arrangements dictated by the 
banks that do business with exchanges, on terms the banks set. Without 
burdensome restrictions, banks will likely dictate fairly robust soundness 
requirements on the exchanges that will become mainstream. 
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2. Should Exchanges Be Allowed to Invest on Virtual Currency 
Should virtual currencies themselves be allowed as permissible 
investments? The maturing nature of virtual currency indicates that Bitcoins 
can be treated like investments more easily than as currency. For tax 
purposes, Bitcoins are treated as investment income. Purchasers and sellers 
who use Bitcoins are cash are relatively safe from the rise and fall of the 
market, and those who use future virtual currency should be aware that their 
value will be based on their ready-exchange rate into cash or traditional 
commodities. But institutional investors and those who seek to earn income 
with Bitcoin purchasers should not be regulated any more stringently than 
individual consumers.190 
New York State regulators would like to make New York and the United 
States a magnet for legitimate, well-regarded exchanges and other virtual 
currency firms. They have already begun scrutinizing Bitcoin firms 
operating within their jurisdiction.191 It should begin by mandating that all 
virtual currency bought and sold by institutions in the state be backed by 
some stable value. GodloveCoins and other virtual currency created with 
encrypted account codes that may be called upon at a later date, should be 
the only permitted medium of exchange in the state that money transmitters 
and institutional investors are permitted to use as investment vehicles. 
Investors should not be permitted to use virtual currency with no correlation 
to a fixed unit of value as speculative ventures; investing in such currencies 
is little different from gambling. 
The basic soundness of these companies should be guaranteed by their 
abiding by current requirements for money transmitters. Regulators should 
avoid creating a separate set of requirements for different technologies that 
effectuate the same result. If my proposed development takes place, the 
safety and soundness of virtual currency will be brought up to a level that is 
tolerable and comparable to similar established technologies. 
Currently, virtual currencies are at their most vulnerable when they are 
available on public offer. The password used by their owner needs only to 
be hacked before the Coins can be transferred out of the owner’s possession 
without his authorization. Current exchanges that keep a majority of these 
                                                                                                                 
 190. Marco Santori, IRS Guidance Further Legitimizes Bitcoin and Provides Clarity, but 
Demands Unrealistic Reporting, BITCOIN FOUND. BLOG (Mar. 26, 2014), https://bitcoin 
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Coins out and available on the market and maintain poor accounting 
practices violate already-established federal law. The Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act and state banking laws make such poor protection of property 
held in trust of another criminally negligent, and possibly federally 
felonious.  As the market develops, standard practices will develop and 
such instances will become rare. 
Future development of Coins of a limited duration, meant to be created, 
traded, and then cashed in in a relatively short period of time, should also 
increase the safety of virtual currency. When coins are automatically kept in 
offline holding and brought to online servers only to be used, then cashed 
in, the risk of theft will be low enough that the development of novel laws 
governing their safety would be counterproductive and duplicative. 
D. The Use of Public Ledgers and Tumblers in Regulation 
Law enforcement officials cite the importance of the public ledgers for 
Bitcoin and other types of crypto-currencies. It is conceivable that some 
virtual currencies could be created without the existence of a public ledger, 
but right now no cryptographically secure currencies exist or can be 
envisioned. Virtual currencies without an existing public ledger are simply 
single-point money transmission devises, similar in most ways to credit-
card payment systems, and do not qualify as true virtual currency. 
Regulators need to require that newly created virtual currencies use public 
ledgers, both for definitional and public interest reasons. Currencies moving 
forward need to contain public ledgers, and these ledgers, as discussed 
above, can prove very helpful to law enforcement. These ledgers can 
accurately record essentially every single transaction that has occurred in a 
specific virtual currency since it came in the being. By seeing every 
transaction, law enforcement can institute a series of red flags for further 
investigation, similar to current banking laws that require disclosures of 
unusual transactions or large deposits. Banks and exchange firms must be 
regulated in the same manner, and through value-backed virtual securities, 
they can be held to relatively simple-to-follow standards for determining 
when large deposits or unusual exchanges have been made through them. 
Individual users and peer-to-peer transactions will be exempt, of course, but 
banks will be obligated to disclose unusual transactions when the 
GodloveCoins are redeemed, if the “cash out” terminating the Coins are 
unusual. This will satisfy law enforcement and still maintain the flexible 
spending of virtual currencies. 
Appropriate know-your-customer requirements for virtual currency 
firms – public ledgers can help mitigate some of the documented concerns 
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related to money laundering and this new technology. Creators of Coins 
will be required to provide documentation to banks or other institutions on 
which they create the Coins, and users of exchanges will also need to 
provide accurate names and addresses, which will severely restrict the use 
of virtual currency in illicit markets while still maintaining the efficiency, 
secrecy and openness that day-to-day users crave. 
A framework of institutions who cater to and facilitate the creation, 
transmission, and termination of virtual currency would obviate many of 
the associated questions about so-called “tumblers,” which are of particular 
concern to law enforcement. Tumblers are a technology used to obscure the 
record and source of virtual currency transactions. By obscuring the public 
ledger, tumblers disguise the users within a block-chain, and could be used 
by criminal enterprises in the middle of a block-chain to launder money. 
This is less of a concern for Coins built to facilitate specific purchases and 
based upon a stable medium of cash because they have a designated bank or 
commodity at the terminal point. 
Conclusion 
This article has laid out the basic foundation of virtual currency. It 
paradoxically holds great promise for ease and safety in facilitating large 
international purchases, while the concept in its current nascent form is a 
useless and criminally mismanaged enterprise that has been flooded with 
the dishonest and foolish. However, it has become a viable and stabilized 
tool for transmission of money pseudo-anonymously over the Internet, and 
state and federal governments must respond. I have laid out the few simple 
laws that must be passed in order to bring virtual currency in line with other 
forms of standard currency transmission, and how such laws will eliminate 
many of the negative aspects of virtual currency while permitting their 
continued development and use. Future articles should respond to various 
government agencies’ floundering first steps in this realm. 
